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Are natural resources a “curse” or a “blessing”? The empirical evidence suggests either 
outcome is possible. The paper surveys a variety of hypotheses and supporting evidence for 
why some countries benefit and others lose from the presence of natural resources. These 
include that a resource bonanza induces appreciation of the real exchange rate, 
deindustrialization and bad growth prospects, and that these adverse effects are more severe in 
volatile countries with bad institutions and lack of rule of law, corruption, presidential 
democracies, and underdeveloped financial systems. Another hypothesis is that a resource 
boom reinforces rent grabbing and civil conflict especially if institutions are bad, induces 
corruption especially in non-democratic countries, and keeps in place bad policies. Finally, 
resource rich developing economies seem unable to successfully convert their depleting 
exhaustible resources into other productive assets. The survey also offers some welfare-based 
fiscal rules for harnessing resource windfalls in developed and developing economies. 
JEL-Code: C12, C13, E01, F43, K42, O41, Q30. 
Keywords: resource curse, cross-country, panel and quasi-experimental evidence, Dutch 
disease, institutions, corruption, financial development, volatility, Hotelling rule, genuine 
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1. Introduction 
Many recognise the opportunities natural resources provide for economic growth and 
development and thus the challenge of ensuring that natural resource wealth leads to sustained 
economic growth and development. Still, many countries are cursed by natural resource 
wealth. The key question is why resource rich economies such as Botswana or Norway are 
more successful while others perform badly despite their immense natural wealth. Is it 
because resource booms induce appreciation of the real exchange rate and makes non-
resource sectors less competitive (Dutch disease)? Are learning by doing and other spill-over 
effects strong enough in those non-resource traded sectors to warrant government intervention? 
Or do the riches of a resource bonanza induce a shift from profit-making entrepreneurship 
towards socially inefficient rent seeking? How much of this depends on the quality of 
institutions, the rule of law and the degree of financial development? Is resource wealth 
plundered by corruption, rent grabbing and civil war at the expense of widespread inequality 
and poverty? Does a resource boom maintain unsustainable, bad policies for too long? Is 
depleting natural wealth sufficiently reinvested in other productive assets?  
To shed light on these important questions, we first present in section 2 the relevant 
stylized facts (case studies, historical and statistical) on the heterogeneous experiences of 
resource rich economies. We then put forward in section 3 eight hypotheses and offer 
supporting theory and the best cross-country, panel-data and quasi-experimental evidence that 
is available on each hypothesis. What transpires is not only how much the experiences of 
resource rich economies differ from other economies, but also the wide variety of experiences 
of different resource rich economies. In section 4 we give detailed attention to the question 
why so many resource rich developing economies deviate from the so-called Hartwick rule 
and do not fully reinvest their resource rents in foreign assets or productive capital (e.g., 
buildings, roads, machines, human capital or health) even though saving is an essential part of 
economic development. The puzzle is why observed and optimal saving rates do not seem to 
differ much in non-resource economies, but differ sharply in resource rich economies. We put 
forward the ‘anticipation of better times’ and the ‘voracious rent seeking’ hypotheses to help 
explain this puzzle. Section 5 offers welfare-based fiscal rules for harnessing resource 
windfalls in developing economies paying special attention to capital scarcity, absorption 
problems and volatile revenue streams. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Stylized facts: is the natural resource curse inevitable? 
Although some resource rich countries benefit from their natural wealth, others are in a 
terrible state. We discuss some well-known examples of countries whose dependence on 
natural resources have gone together with bad macroeconomic performance and growing 
inequality among its citizens and contrast these with others which have benefited from their   2
natural resource wealth (section 2.1). We also discuss historical evidence on how natural 
resources have led to establishment of property rights and contributed to economic 
development (section 2.2). We then discuss some cross-country stylized facts on the effects of 
resources on economic and social outcomes (section 2.3). Finally, we discuss saving statistics 
to see to what extent natural resource wealth is converted into physical, human and other 
wealth (section 2.4).  The main point of these stylized facts is to point out the enormous 
variety of experiences of resource rich countries and the puzzles that they suggest. We leave 
theories for the effects of resources on growth and conflict and the testing thereof to section 3. 
 
2.1. Diverse experiences of illustrative resource rich countries 
Accounts of the resource curse are available for many countries (e.g., Gelb, 1988; Karl, 
1997ab; Wood, 1999; Auty, 2001b). The most dramatic example is perhaps Nigeria (Bevan et 
al., 1999; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003). Oil revenues per capita in Nigeria increased 
from US$33 in 1965 to US$325 in 2000, but income per capita has stagnated at around 
US$1100 in PPP terms since its independence in 1960 putting Nigeria among the 15 poorest 
countries in the world. Between 1970 and 2000 the part of the population that has to survive 
on less than US$1 per day shot up from 26 to almost 70 percent. In 1970 the top 2 percent had 
the same share of income as the bottom 17 percent, but in 2000 the same share as the bottom 
55 percent. Clearly, huge oil exports have not benefited the average Nigerian. Although 
Nigeria has experienced rapid growth of physical capital at 6.7 percent per year since 
independence, it has suffered a declining TFP of 1.2 percent per year. Capacity utilization in 
manufacturing hovers around a third. Two thirds of capacity, often owned by the government, 
thus goes to waste. Successive military dictatorships have plundered oil wealth and Nigeria is 
known for its anecdotes about transfers of large amounts of undisclosed wealth. Oil wealth 
has fundamentally altered politics and governance in Nigeria. It is hard to maintain that the 
standard Dutch disease story of worsening competitiveness of the non-oil export sector fully 
explains its miserable economic performance. Instead, exchange rate policy seemed to be 
driven by rent and fiscal imperatives and relative price movements were almost a by-product 
of the resource boom (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003). 
Other oil exporters (Iran, Venezuela, Libya, Iraq, Kuwait, Quatar) experienced 
negative growth during the last few decades. OPEC as a whole saw a decline in GNP per 
capita while other countries with comparable GNP per capita enjoyed growth. The de-
industrialization and disappointing growth experience of South Africa following the boom in 
gold prices can be explained by the appreciation of the real exchange rate in the 1970’s 
followed by gradual depreciations together with increased barriers to technological adoption 
(Stokke, 2007). The disruption of the ‘air bridge’ from 1994 onwards shifted the production 
of coca paste from Peru and Bolivia to Columbia and led to a huge boom in the demand for   3
Columbian coca leaf. This has led to more self-employment and work for teenage boys in 
rural areas, but not to widespread economic spill-over effects, and the financial opportunities 
that coca provided have fuelled violence and civilian conflict especially outside the major 
cities (Angrist and Kugler, 2008). Greenland benefits from a large annual grant from 
Denmark to ensure a similar GDP per capita to the Danish one. As a result, it has suffered 
from an appreciated real exchange rate as well as rent seeking from a comprehensive system 
of state firms and price regulations (Paldam, 1997).  
Others discuss more positive experiences. Forty percent of Botswana’s GDP stems 
from diamonds, but Botswana has managed to beat the resource curse. It has the second 
highest public expenditure on education as a fraction of GNP, enjoys the world’s highest 
growth rate since 1965 and its GDP per capita is at least ten times that of Nigeria (Sarraf and 
Jiwanji, 2001). The Botswana experience is noteworthy, since it started its post-colonial 
experience with minimal investment and substantial inequality. Of 65 resource rich, 
developing countries only four managed to achieve long-term investment exceeding 25 
percent of GDP and an average GDP growth exceeding 4 per cent, namely Botswana, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand (Gylfason, 2001). These three resource rich Asian countries 
have achieved this by economic diversification and industrialization. Still, they fared less well 
than their neighbours Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea with little raw material wealth. 
Norway has shown remarkable growth of manufacturing and the rest of the economy 
compared with its neighbours despite phenomenal growth in oil exports since 1971 
(Anderssen, 1993; Larsen, 2006). Norway is the world’s third largest petroleum exporter after 
Saudi-Arabia and Russia, but is one of the least corrupt countries in the world and enjoys well 
developed institutions, far sighted management and market friendly policies. 
United Arab Emirates account for close to 10 percent of the world’s crude oil and 4 
percent of the world’s natural gas reserves, but has turned its resource curse into a blessing 
(Fasano, 2002). Its government debt is very small, inflation is low and hydrocarbon wealth 
has been used to modernise infrastructure, create jobs and establish a generous welfare system. 
Major strides in life expectancy and literacy have been made through universal and free 
access to education and health care. In anticipation of depletion of its natural resources, oil-
rich Abu Dhabi has emphasised petrochemical and fertilizers, Dubai has diversified into light 
manufacturing, telecommunications, finance and tourism, and the other emirates have focused 
on small-scale manufacturing, agriculture, quarrying, cement and shipping services. Many 
Latin American countries have abandoned misguided state policies, encouraged foreign 
investment in mining and increased the security of mining investment. Since the 1990’s Latin 
America appears to be the fastest growing mining region, well ahead of Australia, Canada, 
Africa and the US in terms of spending on exploitation. Chile has recently achieved 
remarkable annual growth rates of 8.5 percent while the mining industry accounted for almost   4
half of total exports. Peru ranks second in the world in the production of silver and tin, fourth 
in zinc and lead and eighth in gold and its mineral sectors enjoy prospects for further growth. 
Another leader in this region is Brazil. Argentina seems to be moving ahead as well. 
 
2.2. Historical evidence: natural resources, evolution of property rights and innovation 
Successful resource-based development does not primarily depend on geological endowment. 
The US developed its mineral potential ahead of other countries and continents, including 
Latin America. The positive experiences of the US with its mineral abundance from the mid-
nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century explain much of subsequent economic growth 
(Habbakuk, 1962; David and Wright, 1997). It was a choice driven by collective learning and 
leading education in mining engineering and metallurgy, geological knowledge, 
transportation, increasing returns and an accommodating legal environment where the US 
government claimed no ultimate title to the nation’s minerals (Wright and Czelusta, 2002, 
2003, 2004). The main lesson is that one has to learn to make the most of one’s resources (cf., 
Stijns, 2005). The role of private extraction and mining companies was crucial in this learning 
process. The US was the world’s leading mineral economy in the very period that the country 
became the world leader in manufacturing. Linkages and complementarities of the non-
resource sectors of the economy to the private resource sectors were vital to the American 
economic success. Governments provided weak oversight. High wages may have contributed 
to returns being dispersed throughout the US economy.  
In 1913 the US was the world’s dominant producer of virtually every major industrial 
mineral even though other countries initially seemed to have more mineral reserves. New 
deposits were continuously discovered. The US share of world mineral production in 1913 
was far in excess of its share of world reserves; mineral rich countries like Brazil, Chile, 
Russia, Canada and Australia did much worse in developing new reserves and cheaper 
techniques (Davis and Wright, 1997). The US experience suggests that impending scarcity of 
natural resources can be compensated by technical progress in exploration, extraction and 
substitution and privatization of reserves. Many resource rich economies may have performed 
badly, not because they relied too much on resources, but because they failed in developing 
their mineral potential through appropriate policies. Investment in minerals-related knowledge 
seems a legitimate component of a forward-looking development programme. 
Coal and iron ore deposits spurred industrial development of Germany and the UK 
during the late nineteenth century. South Korea and Japan have taken advantage of fallen 
transport costs and became important steel producers despite relying on import of iron ore. 
Still, history shows that good experiences of resource rich economies are not always 
replicated. In the seventeenth century resource poor Netherlands outpaced Spain, even though 
the latter obtained much gold and silver from its colonies in the New World. More recently,   5
resource poor Switzerland has enjoyed an excellent economic performance compared with 
resource rich Russia. In sum, the effects of natural resources on the economy vary from 
country to country and across different episodes in history. 
More work is required on the changing role of natural resources throughout history. 
The resource curse features especially during the last four decades, but before countries such 
as the US seemed to have harnessed resources for growth. Is this because those countries that 
industrialized first also had good institutions and those countries that remained 
underdeveloped had bad institutions and when resources were exploited at a later stage they 
led to corruption, rent seeking and strife? Key is the contractual basis for exchange. Natural 
resources may be under-produced due to lack of effective property rights and high transaction 
costs (Anderson and Libecap, 2005). The Coase theorem says that with well-defined property 
rights private, voluntary negotiations yield efficient outcomes, but high transactions costs may 
preclude such outcomes. More valuable resources tend to have more precise property rights, 
because the larger benefits from defining and enforcing rights offset the higher costs of doing 
so (Demsetz, 1967). Private mineral rights indeed became more explicit as mine values 
increased. They evolved from local property rules within the mining camps to formal 
territorial and state statutes and judicial opinions as the extent and value of the deposits in the 
regions became more apparent (Libecap, 1976). With increased competition for valuable 
resources, informal rules were insufficient to reduce risk and support long-term investment to 
develop the mines. Making property rights more formal boosted mining investment. However, 
in case of the Western timberlands the transaction costs were more than the government price 
of land and timber depredations continued (Libecap and Johnson, 1979).  
These case studies suggest interesting hypotheses about transactions costs and the 
implications of property rights for turning the resource curse into a blessing. For example, if 
transport costs are high relative to those of manufactured goods, extra resources lower the 
domestic price for a key input to manufacturing giving domestic manufacturers a comparative 
advantage. For example, car producers in Detroit had cheap access to iron ore. Another 
hypothesis is that those exploiting the natural resource can sell their rights and consume the 
entire present value of their reserves, thus causing an initial consumption boom. Otherwise, 
their consumption possibilities seem more limited leading to a higher saving rate. Another 
interesting question is whether the more widespread ownership of resources in the nineteenth 
century had something to do with a smaller minimum efficient scale of production. 
 
2.3. Cross-country correlations 
Fig. 1 indicates a negative correlation between growth performance and the share of natural 
resources in merchandise exports, but this does not tell us anything about causation. Natural 
resource dependence may harm the economy through other variables than lower growth (e.g.,   6
Gylfason et al., 1999; Gylfason, 2001, 2004). For example, partial cross-country correlations 
for oil exporters in the Arab world and elsewhere suggest that resource dependence is 
associated with less non-resource exports and foreign direct investment. Evidence of a sample 
of 87 countries suggest that resource wealth is associated with less openness to foreign trade 
and less openness to gross foreign direct investment, which in turn may harm growth 
prospects. Also, in a sample of 85 countries the share of natural resource wealth in national 
capital is negatively correlated with both gross domestic investment as percentage of GDP 
and the average ratio of broad money (M2) to GDP (a measure of financial development). 
Furthermore, although there are exceptions such as Botswana, there is an inverse correlation 
between resource dependence and school enrolment at all levels, expected years of schooling 
and public spending on education. This may matter as there is a positive correlation between 
education and growth. Finally, empirically there is a positive correlation between natural 
resource dependence and macroeconomic volatility and a negative correlation between 
macroeconomic volatility and growth (e.g., van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009). These partial 
correlations are not inconsistent with the suggestion that resource dependence crowds out 
foreign, social, human, real and financial capital, each effect tending to depress growth.  
 
2.4. World Bank data on natural capital and wealth of nations 
Various components of national wealth for the year 2000 (approximated by the present value 
of sustainable consumption during 2000-25 using a social discount rate of 4 percent) have 
been calculated for nearly 120 countries in the world (World Bank, 2006). Produced capital is 
estimated from historical investment data with the perpetual inventory method. Natural capital 
consists of subsoil assets, timber resources, non-timber forest resources, protected areas, 
cropland and pastureland. Due to data problems, fisheries, subsoil water and diamonds are 
excluded. The explicit value of ecosystems is not evaluated either. The value of natural capital 
is estimated from world prices and local costs. Intangible capital reflects the contribution of 
raw labour, human capital, R&D, social capital and other factors such as institutions and rule 
of law. It is calculated residually as the excess of total national wealth over the sum of 
produced and natural capital and is well explained by school years per capita, a rule of law 
index and remittances per capita. For example, an extra year of schooling yields extra 
intangible capital varying from $840 for low-income to $16,430 for high-income countries. 
Tables 3 and 4 give a flavour of the detailed results.
1 Although global wealth per capita is 
$96,000, this masks huge variety across countries. The share of produced assets in total 
                                                 
1 One of the referees pointed out that these estimates of the share of resources in national wealth 
include human wealth, so that countries with a high wage level such as Norway are measured as having 
a relatively small fraction of their wealth in natural resources. Also, it is more difficult to control for 
initial conditions than with the ratio of resource exports to GDP.   7
wealth is more or less the same irrespective of how poor or rich a country is. However, the 
share of natural capital in total wealth is much higher in poorer countries while the share of 
intangible capital in total wealth is substantially higher in richer economies. Interestingly, 
richer countries have a substantially higher value of natural capital per capita despite having 
lower shares of natural capital in total wealth. The results confirm what we know from the 
literature on economic growth that intangible capital is the main engine of growth and wealth. 
Richer countries focus relatively more on dynamic sectors such as manufacturing and services, 
whereas poorer countries specialize in the more static primary sectors.  
Table 4 indicates that the poorer countries rely relatively heavily on land resources 
(more than two thirds of natural wealth in low-income countries). In the ten wealthiest 
countries only Norway has a natural capital share of more than 3 percent (namely 12 percent). 
On the other hand, the bottom ten countries all have shares of natural capital in total wealth 
exceeding 30 percent. Table 5 indicates that highly resource rich economies, such as the oil 
exporters Nigeria, Venezuela and Algeria, sometimes even have negative shares of intangible 
capital in total wealth. This suggests that these countries have extremely low levels of GNI as 
their returns on productive and intangible capital are very low and possibly even negative. 
Consequently, they have very low total wealth and can sustain only very low levels of 
consumption per capita. This is another manifestation of the resource curse.  
 
3. Popular explanations of the natural resource curse 
The stylized facts discussed in section 2 suggest that the experiences of resource rich 
countries have been very heterogeneous. Some have harnessed their resource wealth to boost 
their economic performance and others have done worse. Here we discuss the theoretical 
support and evidence where available for a wide range of hypotheses about the effects of 
natural resources on the economy and society.
2 Section 3.1 puts forward the hypothesis that a 
resource bonanza induces appreciation of the real exchange rate, contraction of the traded 
sector and expansion of the non-traded sectors and offers some evidence for Brazil on this 
hypothesis. Section 3.2 shows that if the traded sector is the engine of growth, a resource 
bonanza will lead to a temporary fall in growth. Early cross-country evidence indeed indicates 
a negative link between resources and growth. Subsequent panel-data and quasi-experimental 
tests of this hypothesis are also discussed. Section 3.3 puts forward the hypothesis that the 
resource curse can be turned into a blessing for countries with good institutions and provides 
                                                 
2 Earlier empirical work attempts to identify the potential channels of transmission for the resource 
curse by regressing institutional quality, human capital etc. on natural resource dependence only and 
calculating the indirect effects of resource dependence on growth from the coefficients of these 
intermediate variables on growth (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004; Lay and Mahmoud, 2004), but this 
approach suffers from potential omitted variable bias and other econometric problems. 
   8
some evidence in support thereof. Section 3.4 discusses the hypothesis that presidential 
democracies are more likely to suffer a negative effect of resources on growth. Section 3.5 
reviews econometric and quasi-experimental evidence for the hypothesis that resource 
windfalls increase corruption, especially in countries with non-democratic regimes. Section 
3.6 offers econometric support for the hypothesis that volatility of resource windfalls is the 
quintessence of the resource curse and also for the hypothesis that the negative effect on 
growth is less in countries with well developed financial systems. Section 3.7 puts forward the 
hypothesis that resources induces voracious rent seeking and armed conflict, and examines 
cross-country, panel-data and quasi-experimental evidence for this hypothesis. Section 3.8 
discusses the hypothesis that resource windfalls encourage unsustainable and unwise policies. 
Section 4 is entirely devoted to two hypotheses that might explain why many resource rich 
developing countries experience negative genuine saving. Of course, there may be other 
hypotheses which we do not touch upon.
3  
 
3.1. Dutch disease: natural resource windfalls cause de-industrialization 
Early policy contributions highlight the appreciation of the real exchange rate and the 
resulting process of de-industrialization induced by the increase in oil exports in Britain 
(Forsyth and Kay, 1980, 1981). There has also been a relative decline of Dutch manufacturing 
as a result of worsening of competitiveness associated with the export of natural gas found in 
Slochteren (Ellman, 1981). The idea behind this Dutch disease is that the extra wealth 
generated by the sale of natural resources induces appreciation of the real exchange rate and 
an ensuing contraction of the traded sector (Corden and Neary, 1982; Corden, 1984).  
We illustrate this with the Salter-Swan model of a two-sector economy with a 
resource windfall, abstracting from capital accumulation, international investment and 
financial assets. Export of resources thus equals net imports of traded goods, that is 
HTQE=CT–HTF(LT) where Q denotes the world price of natural resources, E the volume of 
exports of natural resources, CT consumption of traded goods, LT employment in the traded 
sector, HT productivity in the traded and natural resource sectors and HTF(LT) output of the 
traded sector (with F′>0, F″≤0). Non-traded goods market equilibrium requires CN=HNG(LN), 
where CN denotes consumption of non-traded goods, LN employment in the non-traded sector, 
HN productivity in the non-traded sector and HNG(LN) output of the non-traded sector (with 
F′>0, F″≤0). With exogenous labour supply of one unit and labour mobility between traded 
                                                 
3 For example, resource dependence seems to be correlated with a bigger Gini index of inequality and 
less political liberties, which in turn are correlated with lower growth (Gylfason and Zoega, 2003). 
Empirical evidence suggests that resources increase income inequality only in ethnically polarized 
societies, after controlling for GDP, schooling, and constraints on the executive (Fum and Hodler, 
2010). Income inequality also reduces immediately after an oil or mineral boom and increases   9
and non-traded sectors, labour market equilibrium requires LT+LN=1. Households maximize 
utility U(CN,CT) subject to the budget constraint PCN+CT=Y, where P is the relative price of 
non-traded goods in terms of traded goods and national income is defined by 
Y≡PHNG(LN)+HTF(LT)+HTQE. Optimality requires UN/UT=P. With CES utility, we have 
CN=Y/(1+P
ε-1)P where ε is the elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded goods. 
The equilibrium condition for equilibrium in the market for non-traded goods, 
 
  HN G(LN) = CN = Y/(1+P




ε=H[F((1−LN))+QE]/G(LN), where H≡HT/HN is the productivity of the traded and 
resource sectors relative to that of the non-traded sector. This equation corresponds to the 
NTGME-locus in fig. 2 and describes those combinations of the real exchange rate P and the 
share of labour employed in the non-traded sector LN that ensure clearing of the market for 
non-traded goods. The NTGME-locus slopes downwards, since a higher P is associated with 
relatively lower demand for non-traded goods and thus with fewer workers employed in the 
non-traded sector. Labour mobility between traded and non-traded sectors requires that labour 
is paid the same in each sector, so that the value of the marginal product of labour is equalized. 
This yields the LM-curve PG′(LN)=HF′(1-LN), which gives those combinations of the real 
exchange rate P and the share of labour employed in the non-traded sector LN that ensure 
labour market equilibrium. The LM-curve slopes upward. A higher relative price of non-
traded goods P pushes up the value of the marginal product of employment in the non-traded 
sector, so employment in the traded sector must decline in order to push up the marginal 
product of labour in the traded sector.  
Higher natural resource revenue QE boosts national income and demand. Hence, the 
NTGME-locus shifts upwards, the LM-locus is unaffected and equilibrium in fig. 2 shifts 
from A to A′. The short-run consequences of higher resource revenues are thus appreciation 
of the real exchange rate (a higher relative price of non-traded goods P), decline of the traded 
sector and expansion of the non-traded sector. Labour shifts from the exposed to the sheltered 
sectors. This boosts both consumption and output of non-traded goods. The rise in 
consumption of traded goods and the contraction in the production of traded goods is made 
possible by additional imports financed by the increase in resource revenues. National income 
rises by more than natural resource revenues (dY=HTd(QE)+CNdP > HTd(QE)). The natural 
                                                                                                                                            
gradually thereafter; uncertainty about future commodity export prices seems to increase long-run 
inequality (Goderis and Malone, 2010).     10
resource bonanza thus increases welfare.
4  The short-run effects of the Dutch disease on 
unemployment are discussed in appendix 1. 
For the longer run effects one must allow capital and labour to be mobile across 
sectors and move beyond the specific factors framework. In an open economy Heckscher-
Ohlin framework with competitive labour, capital and product markets, no resource use in 
production and constant returns to scale in the production of traded and non-traded goods, a 
natural resource windfall induces a higher (lower) wage-rental ratio if the non-traded sector is 
more (less) labour-intensive than the traded sector. In any case, there is a rise in the relative 
price of non-traded goods leading to an expansion of the non-traded sector and a contraction 
of the traded sector. Labour and capital shift from the traded to the non-traded sectors.  More 
interesting may be to study the effects of a resource boom in a dynamic dependent economy 
with adjustment costs for investment and allow for costly sectoral reallocation of capital 
between non-traded and traded sectors (Morshed and Turnovsky, 2004). It is then more costly 
to transform one form of existing capital into another, since this involves demolition. This 
way one has factor specificity for each sector in the short run and factor mobility across 
sectors in the long run. An advantage of this approach is that in the short and medium run the 
real exchange rate is no longer fully determined by the supply side and does not adjust 
instantaneously. If a greater fraction of resource revenues is saved, the initial appreciation of 
the real exchange rate will be less and will eventually be reversed (see appendix 4). One could 
also use a model of endogenous growth in the dependent economy (e.g., Turnovsky, 1996) to 
explore the implications of a resource boom on economic growth. 
What happens if the exploitation sector uses labour and capital as factor inputs? Apart 
from the hitherto discussed spending effects of a resource boom, there are also resource 
movement effects (Corden and Neary, 1982). De-industrialization occurs on account of the 
usual appreciation of the real exchange rate (the spending effect), but also due to the labour 
drawn out of both the non-traded and traded sectors towards the resource sector (the resource 
movement effect). Looking at the longer run where both factors of production (labour and 
capital) are mobile between the traded and non-traded sectors and the resource sector only 
uses labour, it helps to consider a mini-Heckscher-Ohlin economy for the traded and non-
traded sectors. The Rybczinski theorem states that the movement of labour out of the non-
resource towards the resource sectors causes output of the capital-intensive non-resource 
                                                 
4 More elegant is to use duality (Neary, 1988). Let Z(p) denote non-resource national income, so that 
Z′(P) equals non-traded output. Equilibrium in traded and non-traded goods is given by Z(P) + QE = 
e(P)U and Z′(P) = e′(P)  U, respectively, where e(P) = Y/U indicates the CPI and U denotes real 
consumption (utility). It follows that dU/d(QE) = 1/e(P) > 0 and dP/d(QE) = (PCN/Y)/(εS+εD), so that 
windfall revenue from abroad boosts utility. It also leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate, 
especially if the share of non-traded goods in the consumption basket is large, the supply elasticity εS ≡ 
PY″/CN > 0 is large and the demand elasticity εD ≡ − Pe″U/CN > 0 is large. If labour supply increases 
with the real consumption wage (migrants, informal labour), the real exchange rate appreciates less.   11
sector to expand. This may lead to the paradoxical result of pro-industrialization if capital-
intensive manufacturing constitutes the traded sector, despite some offsetting effects arising 
from the de-industrialization effects arising from an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
(Corden and Neary, 1982). If the non-traded sector is more capital intensive, the real 
exchange rate depreciates if labour is needed to secure the resource windfall; the Rybczinski 
theorem then says that the non-traded sector expands and the traded sector contracts. This 
increase in relative supply of non-traded goods fuels depreciation of the real exchange rate. 
Real exchange depreciation may also result from a boost to natural resource exports if the 
traded sector is relatively capital intensive and capital is needed for the exploitation of natural 
resources (Neary and Purvis, 1982). Since less capital is available for the traded sector, less 
labour is needed and thus more labour is available for the non-traded sector. This may lead to 
a depreciation of the real exchange rate.  This also occurs if the income distribution is shifted 
to consumers with a low propensity to consume non-traded goods (Corden, 1984). 
 
Empirical evidence for Dutch disease effects 
Although early evidence for a shrinking manufacturing sector in response to terms of trade 
shocks and real appreciation has been mixed (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003), more 
recent evidence for 135 countries for the period 1975-2007 indicates that the response to a 
resource windfall is to save about 30 percent, decrease non-resource exports by 35-70 percent, 
and increase non-resource imports by 0-35% (Harding and Venables, 2010). These findings 
hold in pure cross-sections of countries (averages across one, two, three or four decades), in 
pooled panels of countries, and in panel estimations including dynamics and country fixed 
effects. Another study uses detailed, disaggregated sectoral data for manufacturing and 
obtains similar results: a 10.0 percent oil windfall is on average associated with a 3.4% fall in 
value added across manufacturing, but less so in countries that have restrictions on capital 
flows and for sectors that are more capital intensive (Ismail, 2010). Using as a counterfactual 
the Chenery-Syrquin (1975) norm for the size of tradeables (manufacturing and agriculture), 
countries in which the resource sector accounts for more than 30% of GDP have a tradables 
sector 15 percentage points lower than the norm (Brahmbhatt, et al., 2010). The 
macroeconomic and sectoral evidence thus seems to offer support for Dutch disease effects.  
Interestingly, macro cross-country and micro US county level evidence suggests that resource 
rich countries experience de-specialization as the least skilled employees move from 
manufacturing to the non-traded sectors thus leading their traded sectors to be much more 
productive than resource poor countries (Kuralbayeva and Stefanski, 2010). 
Quasi-experimental, within-country evidence on the Dutch disease for Brazil has 
recently also become available (Caselli and Michaels, 2009). This study exploits a dataset on 
oil dependence for Brazilian municipalities, which is useful as oil fields are highly   12
concentrated geographically and local resource dependence is more likely to be exogenous as 
it is decided by the national oil company, Petrobras. It turns out that oil discoveries and 
exploitation do not affect non-oil GDP very much, albeit that in line with the Dutch disease 
hypothesis services expand and industry shrinks somewhat. But they do boost local public 
revenue, 20-25 percent (rather than 10 percent) going to housing and urban development, 15 
percent to education, 10 percent to health and 5 percent on welfare. Interestingly, household 
income only rises by 10 percent, mostly through higher government wages. The lack of 
migration to oil-rich communities also suggests that oil does not really benefit local 
communities much. The evidence for Brazil thus offers support for the Dutch disease 
hypothesis, but also to waste in local government and corruption (see section 3.3). 
  
3.2. Temporary loss in learning by doing curbs economic growth 
A declining traded sector is the appropriate market response to a resource windfall. In itself 
this does not justify government intervention, since it is optimal to specialize in one’s 
comparative advantage. Why are resource windfalls then perceived to be a problem? One 
popular answer is that the traded sector is the engine of growth and benefits most from 
learning by doing and other positive externalities, hence non-resource export sectors 
temporarily hit by worsening competitiveness are unable to fully recover when resources run 
out. This can be demonstrated in a two-period, two-good Salter-Swan model where learning 
by doing is captured by future productivity of the traded sector increasing with current 
production of traded goods (van Wijnbergen, 1984a) or with cumulative experience 
(Krugman, 1987).
5 If manufacturing rather than agriculture enjoys learning by doing and the 
income elasticity of demand for agricultural goods is less than unity, shifting from 
manufacturing towards agriculture curbs growth in an open economy (Matsuyuma, 1992). 
Similarly, if human capital spill-over effects in production are generated only by employment 
in the traded sector and induce endogenous growth in both traded and non-traded sectors, 
natural resource exports lower employment in the traded sector, hamper learning by doing and 
thus stunt economic growth (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Gylfason et al., 1999).  
With perfect international capital mobility and no specific factors of production, the 
wage, the relative price of non-traded goods and the capital intensities in the traded and non-
traded sectors are pinned down by the world interest rate. Higher resource revenue then 
induces gradual movement of labour from the traded to the non-traded sector. This reduces 
learning by doing and thus lowers the rate of labour-augmenting technical progress, so that 
the resource boom permanently lowers the rate of growth. One can show that non-resource 
GDP falls on impact after a resource discovery if the traded sector is capital-intensive (see   13
appendix 2). However, if production of traded goods requires natural resources as factor input, 
a higher world price of natural resources leads to depreciation of the real exchange rate and a 
lower capital intensity in the production of non-traded goods which accentuates the fall in 
traded sector employment and throttles learning by doing and growth even more. 
To illustrate how a resource boom affects relative productivity growth of the traded 
and non-traded sector, the adverse effects of the Dutch disease on growth are illustrated with a 
dynamic two-sector economy without capital accumulation, absence of current account 
dynamics and balanced trade (Torvik, 2001). Both traded and non-traded sectors contribute to 
learning. A foreign exchange windfall arising from resource exports then leads to appreciation 
of the real exchange rate in the short run, but real depreciation in the long run. To illustrate, 
allow productivity growth in each sector to increase with the number employed in that sector 
and suppose that learning by doing is more substantial in the traded than non-traded sector. 
Suppose also that the elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded goods in 
consumption ε is less than unity. A fall in relative productivity of the traded sector H≡HT/HN 
induces real depreciation (lower P) and, given ε < 1, a smaller non-traded sector (lower LN). 
After an increase in QE the economy gradually converges to the lower steady-state value of H, 
so over time productivity of the traded sector declines relative to that of the non-traded sector. 
We have already seen in section 3.1 that higher natural resource exports lead initially 
to real appreciation and expansion of the non-traded sector (the shift from A to A′ in fig. 2). 
Over time relative productivity of the traded relative to that of the non-traded sector H 
declines gradually. This induces gradual depreciations of the real exchange rate and falls in 
labour use in the non-traded sector, and corresponds to the movement from A′ to A″ and 
eventually B in fig. 2. In the end this completely chokes off the initial expansion of the non-
traded sector and eliminates the boom of the traded sector through gradual depreciation of the 
real exchange rate. The new steady-state level of production has also moved in favour of the 
non-traded sector, not due to reallocation of labour, but due to the relative fall in the 
productivity of the traded sector. 
 
Empirical evidence for negative effect of natural resources on economic growth 
The pioneering study on the empirical cross-country evidence shows that resource rich 
countries indeed grow on average about one percentage point less during 1970-89 even after 
controlling for initial income per capita, investments during the period, openness and rule of 
law (Sachs and Warner, 1995). The revised cross-country regressions explaining average 
growth in real GDP per capita during 1970-90 are reported in the first regression of Table 1. 
                                                                                                                                            
5 Similarly, giving aid to developing countries may lead to appreciation of the real exchange rate and 
decline of manufacturing (Adam and Bevan, 1999, 2006; Adam and Connell, 2004).   14
There is evidence of conditional convergence, since countries with a low (log of the) level of 
initial real GDP per active member of the population catch up and grow relatively fast. 
Countries with a high log ratio of real public and private gross domestic investment to real 
GDP averaged over 1970-89 grow faster. Countries with a large number of years in which 
their economy is rated as open and whose citizens accept the rule of law more easily (on a 
scale from 1 to 6) grow faster. Even taking account of these traditional growth determinants, 
there is a strong negative effect of resource dependence (measured by the share of exports of 
primary products in GNP in 1970) on growth. This is what has become known as the resource 
curse. This pioneering study gives no role for institutions or bureaucratic quality in explaining 
the curse. The second regression reported in Table 1 uses more countries, more years and an 
index of institutional quality (on a scale from 0 to 1). Using the starting year 1965 rather than 
1970, it confirms that resource rich economies experience slower growth and that institutional 
quality is not significant at the 5 percent level (see, however, section 3.3). 
These regressions are the cornerstone of many discussions of the resource curse, but 
can be criticized on econometric grounds. For example, the share of resources in GNP 
(dependence) is potentially endogenous and, if instrumented, it does not significantly affect 
growth whereas subsoil resource wealth (abundance) does have a significant positive effect on 
growth (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008). However, natural resource wealth is also 
endogenous as it is calculated as the present value of natural resource rents. If it is 
instrumented with the more exogenous measure of economically recoverable reserves, there is 
no evidence for either a curse or a blessing unless one allows for an indirect effect via 
volatility (van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2010). Another issue is the negative correlation 
between growth performance and resource dependence, which may merely be picking up 
cross-country variations in income per capita. Alternatively, if the non-resource traded sector 
declines and the wage premium for education falls, resource rich economies might invest less 
in education and thus the growth rate falls. Hence, adding a control for education implies that 
the negative coefficient on resource dependence should fall. Similar points apply to 
intermediate variables such as wars or institutional quality, so one should be careful about 
drawing inferences about the speed of convergence from the coefficient on initial income. 
There may also be some omitted variable bias if a third factor say ‘underdevelopment’ is 
driving income as then countries with a low income potential are measured as resource rich. 
It is crucial to move from cross-country to panel data evidence to avoid omitted 
variable bias arising from correlation between initial income per capita and the omitted initial 
level of productivity (Parente and Prescott, 1994; Islam, 1995). If resource dependence is 
expressed as a fraction of national income, cross-country regressions that do not control 
properly for initial productivity under-estimate the speed of convergence and over-estimate 
the share of capital in value added. Even though this requires reliable data on changing quality   15
of institutions, school attainment, resource dependence, etc., such problems need not arise 
with panel data regressions. One panel study investigating the link between resources, 
institutional development and growth in 91 developing countries during 1970-2000 finds that 
point-source type natural resources (minerals, coffee, coca) retard democratic and institutional 
development, measured by the degree of democracy for each country over time, and this 
stunts growth (Mavrotas, et. al., 2006; also see Ross, 1999, 2001b). Another panel data study 
finds that the impact of resources on growth found in cross-country regressions disappears 
once one allows for fixed effects; resource dependence (primary exports as fraction of GNP) 
may be correlated with unobservable characteristics (Manzano and Rigobon, 2001). 
Cross-country and panel-data results are sensitive to changing the sample period, the 
sample of countries, or the definition of various explanatory variables. The data may simply 
not allow one to distinguish, for example, whether it is openness to international trade, quality 
of institutions or financial development, since these variables are highly correlated. The road 
forward might be to exploit variation within a country where variables that might confound 
the relationship between resources and macroeconomic outcomes do not vary and the danger 
of spurious correlation is minimized (cf., Caselli and Michaels, 2009). 
 
3.3. Turning the resource curse into a blessing: good institutions and no corruption 
Increased corruption hampers economic growth (Mauro, 1995; Bardhan, 1997; Leite and 
Weidmann, 1999). Mineral wealth may prevent redistribution of political power towards the 
middle classes and thus prevent adoption of growth-promoting policies (Bourguignon and 
Verdier, 2000). Resource wealth worsens quality of institutions, since it allows governments 
to pacify dissent, avoid accountability and resist modernization (Isham, et al., 2003). 
Corruption and granting of import licenses and other privileges to cronies rather than Dutch 
disease seem to be why oil riches have ruined long-run performance of the Nigerian economy 
(Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003). Resource wealth makes it easier for dictators to buy 
off political challengers as President Mobuto has done in Congo with its wealth in copper, 
diamonds, zinc, gold, silver and oil (Acemoglu et al., 2004). Resource riches raise the value 
of being in power and induce politicians to expand public sectors, bribe voters by offering 
them well paid, but unproductive jobs and inefficient subsidies and tax handouts, especially if 
accountability and state competence are lacking (Robinson et al., 2006). Those profiting from 
the resource sector may bribe politicians to provide specific semi-public goods at the expense 
of manufacturing, which curbs welfare if manufacturing enjoys returns to scale (Bulte and 
Damania, 2008). Natural resources also make it attractive for political elites to block 
technological and institutional improvements, since this can weaken their power (Acemoglu 
and Robinson, 2006).    16
Depending on how resource rents affect the leader’s probability of survival, they can 
induce a self-interested leader to invest more or less in assets that favour growth such as rule 
of law or infrastructure, so the effects of resources on economic performance can be highly 
non-monotonic (Caselli and Cunningham, 2009). On the one hand, the ‘busy’ leader faces 
budget and time constraints. Hence, if a resource boom raises the value of staying in office, he 
shifts from productive towards unproductive activities and patronage, contributing to a 
resource curse. On the other hand, the ‘strategic’ leader uses the windfall to keep citizens 
happy and stay longer in power, so the windfall becomes a blessing. A ‘fatalistic’ leader 
realizes that a windfall boosts chances of rebellion and thus is more short-sighted and puts 
less effort into developing the non-resource economy and more into inefficient self-
preservation. However, if the leader responds by offering better and more outside 
opportunities to rebel groups, the windfall may become a blessing.  
  A natural resource bonanza encourages productive entrepreneurs to shift to rent 
seeking. With an aggregate demand externality (and a constant tax rate and no external trade), 
this lowers income by more than the extra income from the resource revenues and thus lowers 
welfare (Torvik, 2002). It helps to make a difference between countries with production-
friendly institutions and others with rent grabbing-friendly institutions (Mehlum et al., 
2006ab). Suppose there is a fixed supply of people that can direct their talent to either rent 
seeking or productive entrepreneurship. Both are thus competing activities. If there are more 
productive entrepreneurs, demand in the economy and profits of each entrepreneur increase 
provided there are demand complementarities in production (Murphy et. al., 1989). In contrast, 
if a greater fraction of talented people is rent seeker (political insider, bureaucrat, oligarch, 
war lord, etc.), the gain per rent seeker declines. One can then distinguish two outcomes 
following a resource bonanza. If institutions are strong and encourage productive 
entrepreneurship, profits of entrepreneurs increase. This means that in equilibrium less people 
engage in rent seeking and more in productive activities (see outcome A″ in fig. 3).  The rent 
of the resource bonanza is more than dissipated. Examples of resource rich countries with 
strong institutions are Australia, Canada, US, New Zealand, Iceland and Norway, and also 
Botswana (Acemoglu et al., 2003). However, if institutions are weak, the legal system 
dysfunctions and transparency is low, rent seeking has a higher return and unfair take-overs, 
shady dealings, corruption, crime, etc. pay off. A natural resource bonanza thus elicits more 
rent seekers and there will be less productive entrepreneurs. In equilibrium profits fall and as 
a result the economy is worse off (see outcome A′ in fig. 3). Weak institutions may explain 
poor performance of oil-rich states such as Angola, Nigeria, Sudan and Venezuela, diamond-
rich Sierra Leone, Liberia and Congo, and drug states Columbia and Afghanistan. There 
institutions are often destroyed by civil wars over control of resources. Dependency on oil and 
other resources hinders democracy and quality of governance (e.g., Ross, 1999). Also, timber   17
booms have induced members of political elites to dissolve forestry management and destroy 
institutions in South-East Asia (Ross, 2001a). 
 
Empirical evidence on how institutional quality transforms effect of resources on growth 
The estimates reported in section 3.2 imply that the curse is cast in stone. But subsequent 
evidence offers support for the hypothesis that with good institutions the curse can be turned 
into a blessing (Mehlum et al., 2006ab). The third regression in Table 1 indicates that 
countries with a high enough index of institutional quality (> 14.34/15.4=0.93) experience no 
curse. This holds for 15 out of the 87 countries (including the US, Canada, Norway, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand and Australia). Five countries belong both to the top eight 
according to natural resource wealth and to the top 15 according to per capita income. 
Resource rich countries with bad institutions typically are poor and remain poor. Related 
cross-country evidence strongly suggests that natural resources - oil and minerals in 
particular – exert a negative and nonlinear impact on growth via their deleterious impact on 
institutional quality
6 rather than through worsening of competitiveness of the non-resource 
export sectors (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003). The adverse effect of resource 
dependence on institutional quality and growth is particularly strong for easily appropriable 
‘point-source’ resources with concentrated production and revenues and massive rents such as 
oil, diamonds, minerals and plantation crops rather than agriculture (rice, wheat and animals) 
whose rents are more dispersed throughout the economy, and with easy appropriation of rents 
through state institutions (Auty, 1997, 2001b; Woolcock, et. al., 2001; Isham, et. al., 2003; 
Boschini, et. al., 2007; Mavrotas, et. al., 2006).  
Appropriability matters, since it indicates the ease of realizing large financial gains 
within a short period and having control over resources. Two types can be distinguished 
(Boschini, et. al., 2007). Institutional appropriability implies that resource dependence only 
has an adverse effect on economic development when institutions are poor. Technical 
appropriability states that the impact of institutional quality and resource dependence is more 
pronounced the more technically appropriable the country’s resources are. Table 2 calculates 
the marginal effects of one standard deviation change in various measures of resource 
dependence that are increasingly technically appropriable on the average yearly growth rate of 
GDP during 1975-88 for different levels of institutional quality (from cross-country 
regressions with a sample of 80 industrialised and developed countries, controlling for trade 
openness, average share of investment in GDP and initial level of income per capita). Going 
from top to bottom in Table 2, we see that better institutions are conducive to growth 
indicating institutional appropriability. Reading Table left to right, the importance of good   18
institutions increases in technical appropriability of resources confirming technical 
appropriability. The curse is thus not cast in stone.  
Bad institutions clearly have an adverse effect on growth. They may also be more 
powerful explanations of cross-country variations in income per capita than geography, trade 
or economic policies (North, 1990; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu, et. al., 2001, 2003; 
Rodrik, et. al., 2004; Easterly and Levine, 2002), but not everybody agrees fully (Glaeser, et. 
al., 2004). Cross-country evidence also suggests a significant negative impact of natural 
resources on income per capita after controlling for institutional quality, trade openness and 
geography, and the curse seems particularly severe in countries with bad institutions and low 
degrees of trade openness (Arezki and van der Ploeg, 2010).
7 Moving towards more trade 
openness and improving institutional quality may thus turn the curse into a blessing. Cross-
country evidence suggests that resource dependence weakens institutions and thus leads to 
worse outcomes for indicators of welfare such as the human development index, availability 
of water, nourishment of the population or life expectancy (Bulte, et. al., 2005). 
 
3.4. Natural resource curse stronger in presidential democracies 
The average effect of natural resources on growth across a sample of countries is thus not 
very informative. Depending on quality of institutions and degree of openness, there are huge 
variations. Following Persson and Tabellini (2003) and using a cross-country sample of 90 
countries, estimates suggest that the resource curse occurs in presidential, not parliamentary 
democracies (Andersen and Aslaksen, 2008). Presidential systems are less accountable and 
less representative and thus offer more scope for resource rent extraction. In contrast, 
parliamentary systems seem better able at using resource revenues to promote growth. The 
nature of the constitutional system is empirically more important than democratic rule itself 
for the link between resource dependence and growth. The empirically observed resource 
curse seems to be mostly driven by presidential countries and non-democratic regimes. 
The adverse effects of resource dependence on growth survive controlling for geography 
such as kilometres to closest airport, percentage land in tropics or incidence of malaria (Sachs 
and Warner, 2001). Natural resources can permanently boost income and welfare through 
higher human capital, and this can offset the direct negative effect of natural resources on the 
growth rate (Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio, 2005).
8 This may explain why Norway has fared 
better than most resource-dependent Latin-American countries. It is thus important to 
                                                                                                                                            
6 This variable is instrumented by mortality rates of colonial settlers (cf., Acemoglu et. al., 2001) and 
the fraction of the population speaking English and European languages (cf., Hall and Jones, 1999). 
7 Gravity equations for bilateral trade flows are used as instruments for international trade (Frankel and 
Romer, 1999) and the fraction of the population speaking English and Western European languages as 
the first language (Hall and Jones, 1999) and colonial origins and settler mortality (Acemoglu et. al., 
2001) as instrument for institutional quality.   19
ascertain whether a low growth rate with a high level of income per capita is a normal state of 
affairs or induced by a resource curse. There is a host of further cross-country econometric 
evidence on the curse (e.g., Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Gylfason, et. al., 1999; Busby, et. al., 
2002). An influential study states that primary commodities exports and fraction of GDP in 
mining belong to the 22 most robust variables out of a list of 59 variables in explaining cross-
country variations in economic growth (Sala-i-Martin, 1997).  
 
3.5. Resource windfalls increase corruption, especially in non-democratic regimes 
Resource dependence elicits corruption and rent seeking via protection, exclusive licenses to 
exploit and export resources by the political elite, oligarchs and their cronies to capture wealth 
and political power.  In a sample of 55 countries resource dependence is indeed strongly 
associated with a worse corruption perceptions index (from Transparency International, 
Berlin) which in turn is associated with lower growth (Mauro, 1995). Cross-country 
regressions also suggest that natural resource wealth stimulates corruption among bureaucrats 
and politicians (Ades and Di Tella, 1999).  It also crowds out social capital, erodes the legal 
system and elicits armed conflicts and civil wars (see section 3.7).  
Panel evidence covering 99 countries during 1980-2004 suggests that natural 
resources only induce corruption in countries that have endured a non-democratic regime for 
more than 60% of the years since 1956 controlling for income, time-varying common shocks, 
regional fixed effects and some other covariates (Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2009). 
Effectively, “bad” politicians have a bigger incentive to mimic “good” politicians in 
democracies. Democratization may thus be a powerful instrument to curb corruption in 
resource rich countries. Another study suggests that the combination of high natural resource 
rents and open democratic systems retards growth, unless there are sufficient checks and 
balances which is not the case in many new resource rich democracies (Collier and Hoeffler, 
2009).
9 However, the best evidence for the effect of windfalls on corruption can be found in 
quasi-experimental studies. One recent study compares changes in perceived corruption in the 
island São Tomé which had a significant oil discovery announcement in 1997-99 with the 
island Cape Verde which did not find oil, both with similar histories, culture and political 
institutions, and uses a unique dataset of the characteristics of all scholarship applicants 
during 1995-2005 and tailored household surveys (Vicente, 2010). It finds that corruption 
increased by close to 10 percent after the announcements of the oil discovery, but decreased 
slightly after 2004. Another study uses data on Brazilian municipalities, a political agency 
                                                                                                                                            
8 Human capital does not appear in the growth regressions, but the interaction term with resources does. 
9  However, longitudinally truncated, pooled cross-sectional evidence may be misleading. Recent 
longitudinal evidence exploits within-country variations in resource dependence and regime types to 
obtain explicit counterfactuals and suggests that oil and mineral dependence may not be associated with 
undermining of democracy or less complete transitions to democracy (Haber and Menaldo, 2008).   20
theory of career concerns with endogenous entry of candidates, and regression discontinuity 
design (Brollo et al., 2010). It finds that a municipal windfall of 10% increases corruption by 
17-24 percent, raises the chances of the incumbent holding on to office by 7 percent, and 
shrinks the fraction of its opponents holding a college degree by 7 percent. Such experimental 
studies pave the way for more convincing evidence on natural resources and corruption. 
 
3.6. Volatility of world resource prices harms exports and output growth 
During the 1970’s when commodity prices were high, resource rich countries used them as 
collateral for debt but during the 1980’s commodity prices fell significantly. Panel data 
estimation suggests that this has thrown many resource rich countries into debt crises. Indeed, 
if debt is also an explanatory variable in the panel data estimation, the effect of resource 
dependence disappears. The empirical results suggest that the effect of resource dependence is 
mainly driven by boom-bust cycles induced by volatile commodity prices, debt overhang and 
credit constraints, and much less by quality of bureaucracy (data from Knack and Keefer, 
1995) or degree of financial development (Mansano and Rigobon, 2001). 
Changes in natural resource wealth are triggered by sudden changes in commodity 
prices or resource discoveries, which can lead to boom and bust cycles. Resource revenues are 
highly volatile (much more so than GDP), because their supply exhibits a low price elasticity. 
Dutch disease can also induce real exchange rate volatility and thus to less investment in 
physical capital and learning, further contraction of the traded sector and lower productivity 
growth (Gylfason et al., 1999). Cross-country evidence suggests that real exchange rate 
volatility can seriously harm the long-term productivity growth, especially in countries with 
low levels of financial development (Aghion et al., 2009). For a monetary growth model it 
can be shown that real exchange rate uncertainty can exacerbate the negative investment 
effects of domestic credit market constraints.
10 Empirically, IMF data on 44 commodities and 
national commodity export shares and monthly indices on national commodity export prices 
for 58 countries during 1980-2002 suggest that there is a long-run relationship between real 
commodity prices and real exchange rates in about one-third of these commodity-exporting 
countries (Cashin, et. al., 2004). However, many countries with abundant natural resources 
are likely to experience volatile real exchange rates which might explain observed volatile 
growth rates of growth that cannot be explained by the conventional, relatively stable 
determinants such as institutions, geography and culture. Historical evidence for the period 
1870-1939 indeed suggests that volatility harms growth for the commodity-dependent 
‘periphery’ nations rather than for Europe or the US (Blattman et al., 2007). Resource rich 
                                                 
10 With endogenous growth, if firms face tight credit constraints, long-term investment is pro-cyclical, 
amplifies aggregate volatility and lowers mean growth for a given total investment rate (Aghion, et. al., 
2005). Under complete financial markets investment is counter-cyclical and mitigates volatility.   21
countries also suffer from poorly developed financial systems and from financial remoteness, 
so that they are likely to experience bigger macroeconomic volatility (Rose and Spiegel, 
2009).  
Building on Aghion et al. (2009), van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) show that with 
commodity price volatility liquidity constraints are more likely to bite and thus innovation 
and growth will fall. Extending Ramey and Ramey (1995), they offer evidence that the 
adverse growth effect of natural resources results mainly from volatility of commodity prices, 
especially for point-based resources (oil, diamonds) and in landlocked, ethnically polarized 
economies with weak financial institutions, current account restrictions and high capital 
account mobility. Instrumenting resource exports with subsoil resource stocks, estimates 
suggest a strong negative and significant effect of macroeconomic volatility on growth and a 
strong and positive effect of exports of especially point-source resources on macroeconomic 
volatility (van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2010).
11 The indirect negative effect of resource 
exports on growth via the volatility channel outweighs any direct positive effect of resources 
on growth. A nonlinear specification suggests that the resource curse is operative only for 
countries with a volatility of unanticipated growth exceeding 2.45% per annum. So it is 
operative for Bolivia but not for Norway (both have a dependence of about 15% on point-
source resource exports over the sample). Volatility thus seems the quintessence of the 
resource curse, but is offset somewhat in countries with high degree of financial development. 
Volatile resource revenues hurt risk-averse households, but welfare losses induced by 
consumption risk are tiny compared with those from imperfect financial markets. If only debt 
contracts are available and bankruptcy is costly, the economy and the real exchange rate 
become more volatile when there is specialization in traded goods and services and the non-
resource traded sector is small (Hausmann and Ribogon, 2002). Effectively, shocks to 
demand for non-traded goods and services – driven by shocks to resource income – are not 
accommodated by movements in the allocation of labour but by expenditure switching. This 
demands much higher relative price movements. Due to bankruptcy costs, interest rates 
increase with relative price volatility. This causes specialization away from non-resource 
traded goods and services, which is inefficient. The less it produces of these traded goods and 
services, the more volatile the economy becomes and the higher the interest rate has to be. 
This causes the traded sector to shrink further until it vanishes.  
                                                 
11 The IV estimates yield an insignificant coefficient for the effect of point-source natural resources on 
mean growth in GDP per capita, but a significant coefficient of −0.394 at the 1% level for the effect of 
the standard deviation of unanticipated growth in GDP per capita, and a significant coefficient of 11.8 
and 5.3 at the 1% level for the effects of point-source and diffuse natural resource dependence on the 
variance of unanticipated growth in GDP per capita. The effects of financial development, openness, 
the distance to nearest coast or navigable river on the variance of unanticipated growth in GDP per 
capita are also significant at the 1% level.    22
Volatility is bad for growth, but also for investment, income distribution, poverty and 
educational attainment (Aizenman and Marion, 1999; Flug et al., 1999). To get round these 
curses, one could resort to stabilization and saving policies and improve efficiency of 
financial markets. It also helps to have a fully diversified economy, since then shocks to non-
traded demand can be accommodated through changes in structure of production rather than 
expenditure switching. This is important for inefficiently specialised countries such as Nigeria 
and Venezuela, but less so for diversified countries like Mexico or Indonesia or naturally 
specialized countries such as some Gulf States. Many resource rich economies have highly 
specialized production structures and thus are very volatile. 
  
3.7. Natural resource wealth induces voracious rent seeking
12and armed conflict 
The political economy of massive resource rents combined with badly defined property rights, 
imperfect markets and poorly functioning legal systems provide ideal opportunities for rent 
seeking behaviour of producers, thus diverting resources away from more productive 
activities (Gelb, 1998; Auty, 2001ab, 2004; Ross, 2001ab). Economists demonstrate that 
resource revenues are prone to rent seeking and wastage. Indeed, self-reinforcing effects of 
rent seeking if rent seekers compete and prey on productive entrepreneurs can explain wide 
cross-country differences in rent seeking (Murphy et al., 1993; Acemoglu, 1995). More rent 
seekers lower returns to both rent seeking and entrepreneurship with possibly large marginal 
effects on production. Since more entrepreneurs switch to rent seeking in times of a resource 
boom, multiple (good and bad) equilibrium outcomes arise. More rent seekers induce negative 
external effects that depress profits for remaining entrepreneurs, which stimulate even more 
people to shift from productive entrepreneurship to wasteful rent seeking. Increased 
entrepreneurship can also crowd out rent seeking. For example, private business can invent 
and supply new substitutes for restricted imports and thus destroy the rents of quota licenses 
(Baland and Francois, 2000).  
The ‘voracity effect’ also causes a drag on growth as seen after the oil windfalls in 
Nigeria, Venezuela and Mexico (Lane and Tornell, 1996; Tornell and Lane, 1999). This effect 
implies that dysfunctional institutions and poorly defined property rights lead to a classical 
commons problem whereby there is too much grabbing and rapacious rent seeking of natural 
resource revenues. It supposes a fixed number of rent seekers. Capital can be allocated either 
to a formal sector where rents derived from a common-good stock may be appropriated or to 
an informal sector with lower returns and no rent seeking. During a natural resource boom 
                                                 
12 Rent seeking is also relevant when countries receive foreign aid (Svensson, 2000). Aid can remove 
pressure to reform, induce recipients to overstretch themselves, cause a Samaritan’s dilemma with the 
donor expected to bail out bad policies, siphon skilled workers away from government and thus weaken 
institutions, and spark conflict over aid rents (Brautigam and Knack, 2004; Harford and Klein, 2005).   23
returns to capital investment in the formal sector rise, so rent seekers appropriate 
proportionately more without destroying the incentive to invest in the formal sector. This 
happens if there is sectoral reallocation or if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is 
sufficiently high so that groups do not refrain from excessively increasing appropriation. 
Rapacious rent seeking in a Markov-perfect equilibrium outcome of a differential game 
lowers the capital left for investment in the formal sector and thus curbs growth. The higher 
profitability of investment is more than undermined by each group of rent seekers grabbing a 
greater share of national wealth by demanding more transfers.  As the number of rent seeking 
groups increases, the voracity effect dampens.  
Production and resource income have differential impact on armed conflict. Higher 
production income makes warfare less attractive and conflict less likely to occur, whereas 
higher resource income makes warfare more attractive as there is more to fight over. Indeed, 
cross-country evidence suggests a negative relationship between shocks in the growth of 
production income and the risk of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Latin, 
2003; Miguel, et al., 2004) and a positive relationship between resource income and conflict 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon, 2005). The export share of primary commodities is the 
largest single influence on the risk of conflict and the effect is nonlinear (Collier and Hoeffler, 
2004).
13 
14 For instance, a country with no resources has a probability of civil conflict of 
merely 0.5 percent, but a country with a share of natural resources in GDP of a quarter has a 
probability of 23 percent. There is now a growing body of cross-country evidence that rents 
on resources and primary commodities, especially oil and other point-source resources, 
increase chances of civil conflicts and wars especially in Sub-Saharan Africa through 
weakening of the state or financing of rebels, sometimes by corporations. Diamonds (Lujala, 
2010), oil (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Ross, 2004; Fearon, 2005; Humphreys, 2005) and 
narcotics (Angrist and Kugler, 2008) especially increase the risk of civil war onsets. Oil 
increases the likelihood of conflict, especially separatist conflict. Lootable resources such as 
gemstones and drug tend to prolong conflict, but do not increase the chances of the onset of 
conflict. There is no evidence for a significant link between (legal) agricultural production 
and conflict. It is onshore rather than offshore oil that is more difficult to protect, encourages 
rebel groups and increases the risk of violent conflict (Lujala, 2010). 
                                                 
13 Wick and Bulte (2006) show analytically the possibility of a non-monotonic relationship between 
resources and conflict intensity. Point-based resources can trigger intense contests but can also 
facilitate coordination on peaceful outcomes. They also demonstrate that contesting resources through 
violent conflict may yield superior outcomes than contests through rent seeking. 
14 Taking account of resource dependence being endogenous to conflict seems to remove the statistical 
correlation between resource dependence and conflict onset, since historically conflict-torn societies 
become more dependent on resources (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009). Resource abundance (reserves 
under the ground) is associated with higher income and reduced chance of onset of war.   24
Some see conflict as reflecting limited capacity of poor countries to put rebellion 
down (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) and others as lower opportunity cost of fighting (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004). It matters whether civil strife and wars result from grievance, a sense of 
injustice about how a social group is treated (e.g., systematic economic discrimination), or 
greed possibly induced by massive rents of point-source resources as in Angola, Congo and 
Sierra Leone (Murshed, 2002; Olsson and Fors, 2004). Furthermore, feasibility is important if 
resources lead to ideological leaders being crowded out by opportunistic, rebel leaders 
generating the worst civil wars (Weinstein, 2005; Collier and Hoeffler, 2005). 
However, cross-country evidence for the effect of resources on conflict suffers from 
being confounded by the effects of quality of institutions, rule of law, etc. on conflict. It is 
more insightful to examine determinants of conflict at the sub-national level, thus eliminating 
such confounding influences. Exploiting variation across four types of violence (guerrilla 
attacks, paramilitary attacks, clashes, and war-related casualties) in 900 municipalities during 
1988-2005 for Columbia and making use of individual-level wage data from rural household 
surveys, a recent study tests the hypothesis that a higher price of capital-intensive 
commodities increases the return on capital and lowers wages, so boosts conflict over the 
ownership of resource production; conversely, a higher price of labour-intensive commodities 
boosts wages and reduces conflict. This hypothesis can be derived from a Heckscher-Ohlin 
model of international trade extended with an appropriation sector (Dal Bó and Dal Bó, 2010). 
The empirical evidence indeed suggests that the sharp fall in coffee prices in the 1990s has 
increased violence in regions growing coffee by lowering wages and opportunity costs of 
joining army groups while the sharp increase in oil prices has fuelled conflicted in oil regions 
by increasing municipal revenue through rapacity (Dube and Vargas, 2008). Hence, conflict 
indeed intensifies if the price of labour-intensive commodities such as coffee, sugar, banana, 
palm and tobacco falls but weakens if the price of capital-intensive commodities such as oil, 
coal and gold falls. The empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis that the state 
colludes with paramilitary groups and protects oil. Also, satellite evidence does not support 
the hypothesis that the fall in coffee prices has induced substitution towards coca which led to 
more violence in coffee regions; but violent deaths escalated differentially in coca regions 
during the 1990s (Angrist and Kugler, 2008). 
Worrisome is that the estimated effects of natural resources on the outbreak and 
duration of war may be flawed, since it fails to take account of the potential impact of fighting 
and armaments accumulation on resource extraction itself. In the face of rebel attacks 
rapacious depletion may be favoured by nationalized mining companies to reduce the stake to 
be fought over despite its economic costs; furthermore, private mining companies invest less 
in unstable countries, especially if their mining investments are not well protected and the 
government’s grip on office is weak; also commitment problems lead a government to under-  25
invest in weapons and mining companies to under-invest in mining equipment; and there may 
be an incentive to bribe rebels to stave off war (van der Ploeg and Rohner, 2010). Without 
binding agreements and sufficient military capacity of the resource-owning faction, war can 
be avoided if resource revenue is transferred to resource-poor rebels (Beviá and Corchón, 
2010).  State capacities should be modelled as forward-looking investments by governments 
which are affected by the risk of external or internal war, the degree of political instability, 
and dependence on natural resources; furthermore, repression and war may both be driven by 
resources and peace, repression and war could be modelled as an ordered probit (Besley and 
Persson, 2009b). More empirical work is needed on the relationship between natural resources 
and conflict that allows for endogeneity of mining investment and resource extraction, 
development of state capacity, and repression outcomes.  
Especially point-source resource rents may, by inducing conflict, put democratic 
institutions to a survival test. Under democracy politicians are less able to appropriate 
resource rents for their own ends, but violent competition with other political fractions is 
costly as armies need to be paid and property may be destroyed. Theory suggests that higher 
resource rents biases political choice from democracy towards violent conflict especially if 
politicians are short-sighted; higher income induced by higher productivity makes democracy 
more likely (Aslaksen and Torvik, 2006).  
Governments of resource rich countries often seem unable to provide basic security to 
their citizens, since natural resource wealth elicits violence, theft and looting often financed 
by rebel groups and competing war lords (e.g., Skaperdas, 2002; Mehlum et. al., 2002). The 
effect of resources on incidence and duration of civil wars features strongly in political 
science (e.g., Ross, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2004; Collier et al., 2004). Rival groups fighting 
about the control over natural resources may harm the quality of the legal system and thus 
undermine property rights. The resulting destruction of output can outweigh the increase in 
output due to the resource boom, but not in homogenous countries. There will thus be an 
erosion of property rights and a resource curse if the number of rival factions is large and 
natural resource revenues are substantial. Fractionalization and fighting can thus lead to over-
dissipation of resource rents. Here we show that the presence of natural resources R can lead 
to erosion of property rights and a resource curse, especially if there are many rivalling 
fractions (cf., Hodler, 2006). Let group i either work for productive purposes li or fight fi. 
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where H, N, φ and F denote productivity, the number of rivalling groups, the quality of the 
legal system and a measure of incorruptibility, respectively. The specification for Ri indicates   26
that group i appropriates more resources if they fight more than others, and the resource 
windfall and “stolen” resources from productive activities are large. The specification of φ 
indicates that fighting undermines effective property rights (cf., Grossman, 2001). The 
optimum outcome of this symmetric Nash game is: 
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More effort is devoted to fighting (rent seeking, corruption or conflict) if resource revenues 
that are at stake R are high and the return on productive activities H is low. In ‘incorruptible’ 
countries (very large value of F, φ close to one) there can still be rapacious rent seeking, 
especially if the number of competing factions N is large, even though the erosion of property 
rights is insignificant. In ‘corruptible’ countries (with low value of F), rent seeking is much 
more severe and may even erupt into corruption or outright conflict. Here fighting causes 
erosion of property rights (higher 1−φ = Nfi/F), which in turn induces even more fighting, 
especially if “corruption culture” is strong (low F). Both the ‘rapacious rent seeking’ and the 
‘erosion of property rights’ effect is stronger if there are more rival factions (high N). Fighting 
implies that there are fewer resources available for productive activities; hence, utility of each 
group is lower. If the country is homogenous (N = 1), there is no fighting and no undermining 
of property rights so that a natural resource bonanza always benefits consumption of its 
citizens. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that the resource curse is more severe in 
countries that have many ethnic or religious fractions and many languages (Hodler, 2006; van 
der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009).  
Caselli and Coleman II (2006) provide a richer theory of coalitions formed along 
ethnic lines competing for natural resources. In ethnically homogenous societies members of 
the losing coalition can defect to winners at low cost, which rules out conflict as an 
equilibrium outcome. Of course, rent of each member of the winning coalition is diluted. In 
ethnically heterogeneous societies members of winning coalitions more easily recognise 
potential infiltrators by skin colour or other physical characteristics and exclude them. We 
should therefore see more conflict in ethnically heterogeneous societies such as Rwanda, 
Sudan, Indonesia, Afghanistan, etc. and less violent resource conflicts in homogenous 
societies like Botswana. Religion or language is not such a good marker, since people can 
easily acquire such characteristics. Caselli (2006) argues that resource dependence generates 
power struggles and political instability, which increases the effective discount rate of the 
governing group. Consequently, the elite invest less in long-run development.  
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3.8. Natural resource wealth leads to unsustainable government policies 
Natural resource wealth may encourage countries to engage in ‘excessive’ borrowing, which 
harms the economy in the short and long run (Mansoorian, 1991). Heavy borrowing on the 
world market induces depreciation of the real exchange rate in the long run. In an economy 
with overlapping generations of households without a bequest motive, the generations alive at 
the time of the exploitation of the resource borrow against future resource income and future 
generations bear the burden of servicing the debt. The consequent fall of aggregate demand 
causes depreciation of the real exchange rate in the long run. Others also find that resource 
rich countries have an incentive to borrow excessively (Manzano and Rigobon, 2001).  
In general, a sudden resource bonanza tends to erode critical faculties of politicians 
and induce a false sense of security. This encourages them to invest in projects that are 
unnecessary, keep bad policies in force, and dress up the welfare state so that it is impossible 
to finance once natural resource revenues dry up. Politicians are likely to lose sight of growth-
promoting policies, free trade and ‘value for money’ management. For example, after the 
discovery of natural gas in the Netherlands, the global oil price shocks during the 1970s and 
1980s and the consequent sharp rise in unemployment, successive Dutch governments 
responded irresponsibly. They expanded public employment and consumption, made 
unemployment and disability benefits more generous, weakened eligibility conditions for 
benefits, raised the minimum wage, and implemented protective labour market legislation 
(Neary and van Wijnbergen, 1986). Starting in 1989, it has taken more than twenty years to 
put the Dutch welfare state on a financially sustainable footing again.  
Many developing countries erred by trying in vain to encourage industrialization 
through prolonged import substitution using tariffs, import quota and subsidies for 
manufacturing. Neo-Marxist policy makers in these countries but also many other economists 
during the 1970s and 1980s found inspiration from the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, namely 
the secular decline of world prices of primary exports (Harvey et al., 2010), to attempt to 
avoid resource dependency through state-led industrialization and import substitution. These 
policies may also have been a reaction to the appreciation of the real exchange rate and the 
decline of the traded manufacturing sectors caused by natural resource wealth. The substantial 
resource wealth in many of those countries may thus have prolonged bad policies. Political 
scientists have advanced several reasons why states have a proclivity to adopt and maintain 
sub-optimal policies (e.g., Ross, 1999). Cognitive theories blame policy failures on short-
sightedness of state actors, who fail to take account of the adverse effects of their actions on 
generations that come after the resource is exhausted, thus leading to myopic sloth and 
exuberance. These cognitive theories also stress a get-quick-rich mentality among 
businessmen and a boom-and-bust psychology among policy makers. Political scientists point 
the finger at abuse of resource wealth by privileged classes, sectors, client networks and   28
interest groups. They also emphasise the rentier state and fault a state’s institutional weakness 
to extract and deploy resources, enforce property rights and resist demands of rent seekers.  
 
4. Why do many resource rich developing countries experience negative saving? 
Section 3 has put forward eight important hypotheses on how natural resources affect the 
economy, institutions, rent seeking, conflict and policy. Here we put forward two further 
hypotheses to explain the stylized fact discussed in section 2.4 that many resource rich 
developing countries are unable to fully transform their large stocks of natural wealth into 
other forms of wealth. To set the scene, section 4.1 discusses the Hotelling rule for optimal 
intertemporal depletion of natural resources and the resulting utilitarian outcome for 
transforming depleting exhaustible natural resource assets into financial capital in a small 
open economy. We suppose throughout that countries have some power on the market for 
natural resources but are price takers in all other markets. Section 4.2 adopts a Rawlsian max-
min social welfare perspective to discuss the optimal level of sustainable consumption and the 
Hartwick rule for re-investing resource rents into durable, non-exhaustible assets. It also 
offers some evidence that many resource rich countries experience negative genuine saving. 
Section 4.3 then puts forward the ‘anticipation of better times’ hypothesis, which suggests 
that resource rich countries should borrow in anticipation of higher world prices for resources 
and improvements in extraction technology in the future. Section 4.4 puts forward the 
‘rapacious extraction’ hypothesis to explain how, in absence of effective government 
intervention, conflict among rival factions induces excessive resource extraction and 
investment and negative genuine saving when there is wasteful rent seeking, investment in 
‘white elephants’ and short-sighted politicians.      
 
4.1. Preamble: Optimal conversion of depleting natural resources into foreign assets 
Most discussions of the resource curse and Dutch disease take the windfall as manna from 
heaven. Earlier literature, however, deals with the optimal intertemporal depletion of 
exhaustible resources (e.g., Dasgupta and Heal, 1979). The main result is the Hotelling rule, 
which states that the rate of increase in the marginal rent of resources must equal the world 
interest rate (possibly including a risk premium). With no extraction costs and constant 
elasticity of demand for resources, the Hotelling rule states that the capital gain on resources 
must equal the world interest rate. This is based on the arbitrage principle, which says that one 
should be indifferent between keeping the resource under the ground (in which case the return 
is the capital gain on reserves) and extracting, selling and getting a market return on it.  The 
rate of increase in marginal resource rents should thus equal the world interest rate. Since 
marginal extraction costs differ widely across countries, optimal depletion rates vary widely 
as well even if each country is a price taker.   29
  Consider the optimal conversion of depleting exhaustible resources into foreign assets 
for a small open economy which uses capital and resources in production, obtains an 
exogenous return on investment abroad, and faces elastic demand for its resources on the 
global market (Dasgupta et al., 1978). Maximizing social welfare yields the Hotelling rule and 
the efficiency conditions that the marginal product of capital must equal the world interest 
rate and that of resources the world price of resources. The optimal rate of resource depletion 
thus equals the elasticity of world demand for its resources times the interest rate. The initial 
price and the resulting depletion path of natural resources are set so that reserves are 
eventually completely exhausted. A resource discovery thus leads to an immediate fall in the 
resource price and increase in the rate of resource depletion. Suppose world demand for 
resources is given by E=E(Q), where Q is the price of natural resources and ε ≡ − QE′/E > 1 
the constant elasticity of demand. The social planner maximizes utilitarian social welfare, 
0 U( ( ))exp(- )d , Ct t t ρ
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∫ subject to the equations describing natural resource depletion, the 
dynamics of the current account and the Cobb-Douglas production function, i.e., 
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where C, S, R, A, K, Y, r and ρ denote consumption, the resource stock, resource use in 
production, national assets, the capital stock, domestic production, the exogenous world 
interest rate and the subjective rate of time preference, respectively. The production function 
has decreasing returns to scale with respect to K and R (0 < α+β < 1). It follows that: 
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where σ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The first and second equation equate 
the marginal products of capital and resource to the interest rate and the marginal revenue of 
natural resources, the third equation is the Hotelling rule which (given that demand for 
resources is iso-elastic) says that capital gains on natural resources must equal the rate of 
interest  r, and the fourth equation is the Keynes-Ramsey rule. Effectively, the first three 
equations result from maximizing the present value of natural resource and other income 
while the fourth equation results from choosing the timing of consumption to maximize utility. 
It follows that capital and natural resource use must decline over time: 
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Substituting the rates of decline of E and R into the resource depletion equation, using the 
marginal factor productivity conditions, and integrating over time gives two equations relating 
E(0) and R(0) to S(0): 
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Hence, a resource bonanza (higher S(0)) lifts the declining paths of resource use and resource 
exports up (higher R(0) and E(0)), also lifts the declining paths of capital and production, and 
depresses the price trajectory (higher Q(0)). Since the optimum production in this small open 
economy depends only on world prices, the optimal trajectories of E,  R,  K, and Y are 
independent of consumer preferences (σ and ρ). Substituting these together with the Euler 
equation into the present-value national wealth constraint, one gets initial consumption: 
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where  Y(0),  K(0) and Q(0) directly follow from E(0) and R(0). Since Y(0)−rK(0) equals 
W(0)+(1−1/ε)Q(0)E(0) and the wage W grows at the same rate as output, households consume 
a constant fraction of the sum of financial, human and natural resource wealth. Clearly, a 
higher σ or lower ρ boosts consumption growth, but lowers C(0). The expression for initial 
consumption holds for all instants of time. Natural resource wealth (QE/rε) declines over time 
at the rate (ε−1)r and human wealth declines at the rate βr/(1−α−β). Hence, supposing that 
r=ρ, a constant level of consumption can be sustained by accumulating sufficient foreign 
assets, A, to compensate for the continually declining levels of natural resource and human 
wealth. It is easy to extend the results to a return that declines with the level of foreign 
investment, e.g, r = r(A−K), r′<0, or to allow for some uncertain date in the future at which 
prices fall due to invention of some new alternative technology or source of resources 
(Dasgupta et al., 1978). 
These pioneering insights on optimally converting natural resources into financial 
assets have not yet been extended to take account of resource windfalls harming 
competitiveness, provoking corruption, rent seeking and other distortions.
15 But analysis of a 
basic Dutch disease model without capital accumulation albeit with learning by doing   31
indicates that after a windfall, one should gradually adjust the optimal share of national 
wealth consumed downwards and accept some adverse Dutch disease effects (Matsen and 
Torvik, 2005). Lower growth in resource rich economies may thus be part of an optimal 
growth path. The challenge is to re-investigate these issues for a dependent economy with 
capital accumulation, specific factors or intrasectoral adjustment costs and learning by doing, 
where wages and capital intensities are not fixed by technology and the world interest rate.  
Non-renewable or exhaustible resources typically imply steady declines in income per 
capita. With environmental resources being a production factor and production displaying 
constant returns to scale, capital and labour run into jointly diminishing returns (Nordhaus, 
1992). In the AK-model of endogenous growth with natural resources as production factor, a 
positive growth rate of consumption cannot be sustained forever either (Aghion and Howitt, 
1988, Chapter 5). Faster population growth increases pressure on the finite resource and thus 
reduces per capita growth. However, resources such as fisheries, forests and agricultural land 
are renewable. This raises questions about how a limited renewable resource sector can co-
exist with a growing sector in balanced growth equilibrium. Typically, this requires 
technological progress in use of the resource to be sufficiently faster than in use of other 
inputs. If proper account is taken of renewable resources, ongoing growth is feasible (e.g., 
Bovenberg and Smulders, 1996; Elíasson and Turnovsky, 2004). 
The literature on optimal oil exploitation pays ample attention to the market structure 
of oil producers. Typically, the monopolist OPEC is considered together with a competitive 
fringe of price-following oil producers. One feedback Nash outcome is an initial phase where 
the monopolist sets prices low enough to exhaust the fringe and a final phase where the 
monopolist enjoys higher monopoly profits; the price at the end of the first phase is then not 
high enough to incite the fringe to postpone extraction (Newbery, 1981; Groot et al., 2003). 
 
4.2. Genuine saving and the wealth of nations: a pragmatic guide 
The Hartwick rule of investing all resource rents in other forms of capital provides a 
pragmatic guide for sustainable development. Genuine saving is the traditional concept of net 
saving, namely public and private saving minus depreciation of public and private investment, 
plus current spending on education to capture the change in intangible (human) wealth minus 
the value of net depletion of exhaustible natural resources and renewable resources (forests) 
minus damages of stock pollutants (carbon dioxide and particulate matter) (Hamilton and 
Clemens, 1999; Hamilton and Hartwick, 2005). Alas, fisheries, diamonds, subsoil water and 
soil erosion are not dealt with due to data problems. With positive genuine saving, a nation 
becomes richer and social welfare increases, and with negative genuine saving, a nation loses 
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wealth and social welfare falls (Dasgupta and Mäler, 2000). Wealth per capita is the correct 
measure of social welfare if the population growth rate is constant, per capita consumption is 
independent of population size, production has constant returns to scale, and current saving is 
the present value of future changes in consumption (Dasgupta, 2001a). 
Genuine saving estimates calculated by World Bank (2006), based on Atkinson and 
Hamilton (2003), presented in fig. 4 show an alarming picture. Countries with a large 
percentage of mineral and energy rents of GNI typically have lower genuine saving rates. 
This means that many resource rich countries become poorer each year despite the presence 
of large natural resources. They do not fully reinvest their resources at the expense of future 
generations by not investing in intangible or productive wealth. For example, Venezuela 
combines negative economic growth with negative genuine saving while Botswana, Ghana 
and China with positive genuine rates enjoy substantial growth in the year 2003. Highly 
resource dependent Nigeria and Angola have genuine saving rates of minus 30 percent, which 
impoverishes future generations despite having some GDP growth. The oil/gas states of 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation all have 
negative genuine saving rates; they seem to be consuming or wasting rather than re-investing 
their natural resource rents. 
Fig. 5 calculates by how much productive capital would increase by 2000 if countries 
would have invested their rents from crude oil, natural gas, coal, bauxite, copper, gold, iron, 
lead, nickel, phosphate, silver and zinc in productive capital since 1970. The calculations 
provide an upper bound, since they abstract from marginal extraction costs due to data 
problems. High resource dependence is defined as minimally a 5 percent share of resource 
rents in GDP. We see that resource rich countries with negative genuine saving such as 
Nigeria or Venezuela could have boosted their non-resource capital stocks by a factor of five 
or four if the Hartwick rule would have been followed. This is also true for oil/gas rich 
Trinidad and Tobago and copper rich Zambia. All the countries in the top right quadrant 
(except Trinidad and Tobago) have experienced declines in per capita income from 1970 to 
2000. If the Hartwick rule would have been followed during the last few decades, these 
economies would have been much less dependent on oil and other resources than they are. 
The Solow-Swan neoclassical model of economic growth predicts that countries with 
high population growth have lower capital intensities and thus lower income per capita. 
Similarly, in countries with high population growth rates genuine saving can be positive while 
wealth per capita declines (World Bank 2006, Table 5.2). Such countries are on a treadmill 
and need to create new wealth to maintain existing levels of wealth per capita. They thus need 
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to save more than their resource rents.
16 Sub-Saharan Africa has high population growth and 
shows substantial saving gaps typically of 10 to 50 percent of GNP. For Congo and Nigeria 
the saving gaps are as high as 110 percent and 71 percent, respectively. 
Even countries that save a large part of their natural resource wealth can fare badly. 
An early influential study found that about half of the windfall income of six oil-producing 
countries (Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela) after 
the oil price hikes of 1973 and 1979 was invested domestically (overwhelmingly by the public 
sector), but that nevertheless all countries experienced prolonged periods of real exchange 
appreciation and negative growth (Gelb, 1988). The roots of this puzzling feature may be 
investment in socially undesirable public investment projects or ‘white elephants’ (Robinson 
and Torvik, 2005) and high population growth. We show in the next section that, even 
without such ‘white elephants’, it may not be optimal for such countries to save less than their 
resource rents if world resource prices are expected to increase and improvements in 
exploration technology are anticipated in the future. 
 
4.3. Anticipation of better times can induce negative genuine saving 
Consider a small resource-exporting economy which takes the world interest and world price 
for its final products as given, but exerts some monopoly power on the world market for 
natural resources. We investigate max-min social welfare and investigate what needs to be 
done to sustain a constant level of per-capita consumption.
17 To do this, suppose that there is 
no use of exhaustible resources in production and no population growth. The production 
function is f(K) with f′>0 and f″<0, and there is no depreciation of the capital stock. The cost 
of extracting E units of resources is TC(E) with C′>0 and C″≥0, where a fall in T indicates a 
boost to extraction productivity. World demand for oil equals E = E(Q/Q*) with ε  ≡ 
−QE′(Q)/E > 1, where Q* is the world price of oil sold by its competitors. Saving of the 
nation is given by 
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The initial stock of oil S0 defines the maximum amount of oil that can be depleted: 
 
                                                 
16 Positive population growth gives a negative shadow price of time and thus positive genuine saving; 
technical progress gives a positive shadow price of time and negative genuine saving (Farzin, 2010). 
17 Although the Keynes-Ramsey rule,  /( ) , CC r σ ρ =−  suggests that it is feasible to sustain a constant 
level of per-capita consumption in the small resource-exporting economy even if there is no max-min 
welfare (i.e., σ ≠ 0) provided that r* = ρ, this is not the case for the closed economy. The optimal path   34
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There are two efficiency conditions: 
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The first one states that the marginal product of capital is set to the interest charge. The 
second requires that the marginal resource rents must increase at a rate equal to the world 
interest rate. An anticipated positive rate of increase in the world resource price or in the rate 
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With exogenous continual improvements in extraction technology (τ > 0), it pays to delay 
depletion of reserves to reap the benefits of technical progress. The rate of increase in the 
price of resources and the rate of change in resource depletion are then reduced even further. 
Now consider the case 
** * /0 QQ π ≡>  . This pushes up the rate of increase in the price of 
resources charged by the country and postpones resource depletion. We assume r − π* > μ 
(π*+τ), so π > π* and reserves are not exhausted in finite time. With a constant r* and π* and 
no costs of extraction, one has  00 (0) ( *)S ( *)S . Er επ π ε π =− =− Reserves are exhausted 
relatively slowly if the world interest rate is low and the world rate of increase in the world 
price is high. In general, this is also true if the rate of technical improvements in exploration 
technology is high. Sustaining the max-min level of constant consumption requires: 
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for the closed economy first has per-capita consumption rising and then falling and vanishing 
asymptotically; the first phase may not occur (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; chapter 10 and appendix 3).   35
This saving rule extends the Hartwick rule to an open economy. The first term says that the 
nation saves the marginal resource rents valued at the world resource price minus marginal 
extraction costs, so depletion of natural resource reserves must be compensated by increases 
in foreign assets. The second term is the ‘anticipation of better times’ term. It says that the 
nation saves less if it expects the world interest rate (provided A>K) or the price of its 
resources to increase in the future. The country then saves less and postpones extraction. The 
nation also saves less if it expects positive technical progress in future oil extraction 
technology. A special case arises if extraction costs are zero and the world price of resources 
follows the Hotelling rule, because then the depletion rate is given by 
* /( ) EE r ε π =− −  and 
the max-min saving rule becomes  (1 1 / ) * . A QE Q S επ =− −   Saving marginal resource rents 
minus imputed interest on the value of natural resource reserves thus sustains a constant level 
of consumption. Countries with abundant reserves of exhaustible resources should thus run a 
current account deficit if resource rents fall short of the imputed rent on the value of resource 
reserves. Genuine saving is thus negative, i.e., 
1* (1 ) 0. AQ S Q S επ
− + −= −<   
Since the country saves less than its marginal resource rents and postpones extraction 
of exhaustible resources if it expects extraction technology to continually improve or the price 
it can fetch for its resources to continually increase in the future (cf., Asheim, 1986; Vincent 
et al., 1997; van der Ploeg, 2010a)
18, it is a priori unclear whether observed negative genuine 
saving for resource-rich economies are due to poor institutions, badly functioning capital 
markets, corruption or mismanagement or due to anticipation of better times. It is optimal for 
a country with substantial oil reserves to save less than a country with almost no reserves, 
because it makes sense to sell more of its reserves in the future when the price of oil is higher. 
 
The Hartwick rule in the global economy 
To examine the Hartwick rule for the global economy, consider a world consisting of natural 
resource (say, oil) exporters and oil importers. With free international trade in oil and goods, 
perfect capital mobility, zero labour mobility, no technical progress, no population growth 
and identical technologies for both blocks, the max-min egalitarian outcome can be 
characterized (Asheim, 1986, 1996). Factor intensities are determined by the world interest 
rate and price of oil. The ratios of output, capital and resource use in oil-exporting economies 
relative to those in oil-importing economies are then identical and equal to the ratio of the 
labour force of oil-exporters relative to that of oil-importers.  
                                                 
18 Similar arguments can be applied to deforestation in a small open economy with a large endowment 
of forest land and small endowment of agricultural land (Hartwick et al., 2001). The early phases of 
clearing forest land are then governed by the high price of agriculture while later phases are driven by 
profits from marketing timber from cleared land.    36
On the efficient max-min path oil exporters consume the full marginal product of 
their human capital plus their oil rents, but consume only a fraction of the marginal product of 
physical capital and the remainder is used to accumulate national wealth to compensate for 
the decreasing rate of return on capital. This fraction equals one minus the ratio of the share of 
resource rents to the share of capital income in value added. Oil importers consume less, since 
they have no oil rents. If oil exporters owned all physical capital, they would be investing all 
oil rents in physical capital. They would then use all natural resource rents for consumption 
and run a foreign financial debt. Oil has no marginal productivity as a stock, but oil exporters 
can consume a fraction of the capital gains. Oil exporters can thus indefinitely sustain positive 
consumption by consuming only a fraction of their resource rents, especially if these are large 
relative to capital income. Since the Hotelling rule implies that oil exporters enjoy a growing 
income from oil revenues over time, they need to save less than the Hartwick rule to keep 
consumption constant. Conversely, oil importers need to save more to afford the increasing 
cost of oil imports and sustain a constant level of consumption. Resource rich economies thus 
sustain consumption by consuming a fraction of their marginal resource rents. Alas, no 
empirical tests of this proposition are available yet. 
 
4.4. Fractionalization, voracious depletion, excessive investment and genuine saving 
Section 4.3 advanced the hypothesis that resource rich economies may not save all of their 
resource rents in anticipation of better times (e.g., higher rate of increase in the prices for its 
resource products or ongoing technical progress in resource extraction). An alternative 
hypothesis is that resource rich countries have to contend with rival factions competing for 
natural resource rents. The modern political economy of macroeconomics literature, surveyed 
in Persson and Tabellini (2000), abstracts from the intertemporal aspects of natural resource 
depletion, but is of obvious relevance to the crucial question of why countries seem to be 
impatient and do not reinvest all their resource rents. This literature highlights deficit biases in 
the absence of a strong minister of finance due to government debt being a common pool 
(Velasco, 1999), debt biases if political parties have partisan preferences over public goods 
and the probability of removing the government from office is high (Alesina and Tabellini, 
1989), and delayed stabilization resulting from different groups in a ‘war of attrition’ 
attempting to shift the burden of higher taxes or spending cuts  to other groups (Alesina and 
Drazen, 1991). A common insight of this literature is that the rate of discount used by 
politicians may be higher than the rate of interest by, for example, the probability of being 
removed from office. Indeed, if a faction worries it may not be in office in the near future, it 
will extract natural resources much faster than is socially optimal and will borrow against 
future resource income (or accumulate less assets than is socially optimal) in order to gain at 
the expense of future successors.  This could show up as capital flight and higher private   37
consumption for the faction in power or higher public spending of the type that primarily 
benefits those in power.  
There are no studies available yet, which attempt to apply these political economy 
insights to a formal model addressing the optimal depletion of natural resources. This is an 
interesting area for further research and some of these issues are discussed in section 5 which 
deals with optimal harnessing of given natural resource windfalls. Here we offer as a first step 
a simple analysis of how common-pool problems induce competing factions to use a discount 
rate greater than the interest rate in the Hotelling rule which in turn leads to voracious natural 
resource depletion, excessive investment rates, less build-up of foreign assets and lower 
consumption than is socially optimal for the small open economy of section 4.3.
19 
20 This 
analysis also allows us to illustrate how natural resources are gradually transformed into 
foreign assets. Although we do not offer a full political economy analysis, we do clarify some 
conceptual issues to do with measuring genuine saving in non-competitive environments and 
suggest that World Bank figures may under-estimate genuine saving. 
The dynamics of the stock of natural resources owned by each faction i is given by 
() , ii j i
ji
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=− + − ∑    0 (0) . ii SS = Here ξ > 0 indicates the speed by which oil, gas or 
water seeps from one field to another or the degree of imperfection of property rights on 
natural resources (van der Ploeg, 2010a). No seepage (as is the case for gold, silver or 
diamonds) or perfect property rights corresponds to ξ = 0. In general, we have ξ > 0. As in 
Lane and Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane (1999), we make a distinction between 
uncontested  stocks of foreign assets (bonds and capital) and contested  stocks of natural 
resources.
21 Furthermore, extraction costs are zero, the production function of each group is 
given by 
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⎝⎠ ∑    Resources of each competing faction are perfect 
substitutes in demand. A homogenous society with perfect property rights has the usual 
Hotelling rule  /. QQ r =    The Hotelling rule under fractionalization (N > 1) becomes 
/( 1 ) , QQ r N r ξ =+ − >  so resource prices rise faster than the rate of interest if there are 
factions contesting resource rents, seepage is strong, or property rights imperfect. As a 
                                                 
19 With a max-min specification of social welfare (σ = 0), consumption of each faction will be constant 
over time. With a positive elasticity of intertemporal substitution (σ > 0), short-sighted factions induce 
excessive resource extraction and less accumulation of foreign assets which will lead to a bias towards 
higher consumption in the short run and lower consumption in the long run. 
20 This can also be shown for a closed economy with capital accumulation where the subgame-perfect 
Nash equilibrium yields a suboptimally low level of sustainable consumption (van der Ploeg, 2010c).   38
consequence of the higher discount rate used by competing factions, resource extraction is 
more voracious and the rate of decline of natural resource revenues, 
.
( )/ ( ) ( 1)[ ( 1)], QE QE r N εξ =− − + − is higher in more fractionalized societies. Although 
fractionalized societies save a greater fraction of their natural resource 
revenues,
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especially if N is large and world demand for resources is more elastic. The sustainable level 
of consumption equals interest on initial foreign assets plus wage income plus interest on 
accumulated wealth, 
/(1 )
0 (1 )( / ) , Cr A r r S W F
αα αα
− =+ − + and is thus lower in fractionalized 
societies where resources suffer from weak property rights and seepage. It is thus optimal to 
gradually transform natural resource reserves into interest-earning foreign assets. The wealth 
of the state, i.e., sovereign wealth, gradually grows from A0 to A0+SWF. The final level of 
accumulated foreign assets in a fractionalized society is less than in a homogenous society 
despite the lower initial price of natural resources. Also, the speed of transformation is faster 
in a fractionalized society. It is the interest earned on sovereign wealth that makes up for 
dissipating resource revenues and thus makes it possible to sustain constant consumption as 
resources are depleted. Comparing the market with the socially optimal outcome suggests that 
benevolent governments redistribute from the lucky cohort that discovers resources to later 
cohorts by bequeathing them a large stock of foreign assets. 
  If there is an imperfect mechanism for resource allocation, one must use the true 
accounting prices QA when calculating genuine saving (Dasgupta and Mäler, 2000; Dasgupta, 
2001b; Arrow et al., 2003). These are the effect of a marginal increase in the initial stock of 
resources on social welfare divided by the effect of a marginal increase in initial foreign 
assets on social welfare. In the present context, this amounts to: 
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In societies that are homogenous or have perfect property rights the accounting price equals 
marginal resource revenue. In fractionalized societies with insecure property rights, however, 
the accounting price is higher and is closer to the world price of resources. Estimates of 
                                                                                                                                            
21 The Keynes-Ramsey rule is again / ( ), CC r σ ρ =−  so that the rate of growth in consumption is not   39
genuine saving should use accounting prices; if they use marginal revenues, they yield a too 
optimistic estimate, and if they use market prices of resources, they yield a too pessimistic 
estimate of genuine saving in fractionalized societies. Using true accounting prices, genuine 
saving is zero,  (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 0, AA AQ S AQ E += −=   even though the struggle over 
resources depresses consumption and welfare. Effectively, both resource extraction and 
investment in foreign assets occur at a rate that is from a social perspective too high, thereby 
leaving genuine saving unaffected.  
Interestingly, rapacious rent seeking in itself does not explain the observed negative 
genuine saving rates of many developing resource rich countries (unless erroneously market 
rather than accounting prices are used to calculated genuine saving – a data artefact). The 
‘anticipation of better times’ hypothesis (see section 4.4) helps to explain observed negative 
genuine saving, but a deeper analysis of the political distortions of rapacious rent seeking 
should offer a better explanation. Countries with a lot of fighting about natural resources 
suffer from corruption and erosion of the quality of the legal system, thus discouraging saving 
and investment in productive capital (see section 3.7), may over-invest in public investment 
projects as an inefficient form of distribution to the own group members as they are not so 
obviously corrupt within the context of a dynamic citizen-candidate model for a 
representative democracy (cf., Besley and Coate, 1997, 1998), may over-invest in public 
investment projects with negative social surplus (‘white elephants’) as a form of credible 
redistribution as all politicians can commit to socially efficient public investment projects (cf., 
Robinson and Torvik, 2005), and often attract short-sighted politicians. If added to our 
explanation of voracious resource depletion and excessive investment, these features should 
give a realistic explanation of the negative genuine saving rates observed in many developing 
resource rich economies.   
 
5. Harnessing natural resource windfalls in developing economies 
Despite the normative and political analyses of converting depleting natural resources into 
productive assets discussed in section 4, there are good technical reasons to pump oil as fast 
as possible out of the ground once a field has been opened. So it may be better to focus at the 
optimal way of harnessing a given windfall (e.g., Collier et al., 2010). Such windfalls are 
typically anticipated (five years or so) and temporary (say, 20 years). The benchmark for 
harnessing such a windfall is based on the permanent income hypothesis, which says that 
countries should borrow ahead of the windfall, pay back incurred debt and build up sovereign 
wealth during the windfall and finance the permanent increase in consumption out of the 
interest on the accumulated sovereign wealth after the windfall has ceased. Indeed, the IMF 
                                                                                                                                            
affected by conflict among factions. The analysis focuses on Rawlsian max-min outcomes (σ = 0).   40
has often recommended resource rich countries to put their windfalls in a sovereign wealth 
fund (e.g., Davis et al., 2002). Fig. 6 shows how the permanent income hypothesis and the 
consequent building up of such a fund are used to optimally harness unanticipated windfalls. 
In practise countries such as Norway prefer to restrict incremental consumption to interest 
earned on the fund and not to use the windfall until it is banked, which gives the conservative 
bird-in-hand rule. Estimation of fiscal reaction functions for non-hydrocarbon tax and public 
spending using official projections for hydrocarbon revenues and the pension burden for 
Norway suggests that fiscal reactions have been partially forward-looking with respect to the 
pension bill, but indeed not with respect to hydrocarbon revenues (Harding and van der Ploeg, 
2009). The primary non-hydrocarbon deficit should according to the permanent income 
hypothesis react only to permanent oil/gas revenues, but in practise it also reacts to current 
revenues. This suggests that Norway has used the bird-in-hand rule rather than the permanent 
income rule. VAR analysis of a DSGE model of oil-rich economies with a traded and non-
traded sector suggests that the fiscal rules of Mexico and Norway with respectively a small 
and big emphasis on saving windfalls can explain the Mexican hump-shaped impulse 
responses for output, the real exchange rate and private consumption and the flat responses 
for Norway (Pieschacon, 2009). More DSGE work is needed on resource rich economies, also 
paying attention to monetary policy rules, sterilization of foreign exchange windfalls and 
unemployment in the light of natural resource windfalls. 
One must take account of the special features of resource rich developing countries. 
Many of them are converging on a development path, suffer capital scarcity and high interest 
rates resulting from premium on high levels of foreign debt, and households do not have 
access to perfect capital markets. In that case, the permanent income hypothesis is 
inappropriate. In contrast to transferring much of the increment to future generations (as with 
the permanent-income and bird-in-hand rules), the optimal time path for incremental 
consumption should be skewed towards present generations and saving should be directed 
towards accumulating of domestic private and public capital and cutting debt rather than 
accumulating foreign assets (van der Ploeg and Venables, 2010a).  The resulting optimal 
micro-founded path for incremental consumption is given in fig. 6. Effectively, the windfall 
brings forward the development path of the economy. Although the hypothesis of learning-
by-doing in the traded sector may be relevant for advanced industrialised economies, 
developing economies are more likely to suffer from absorption constraints in the non-traded 
sector especially as it is unlikely that capital in the traded sector can easily be unbolted and 
shunted to the non-traded sector. This cuts the other way, since it is then optimal to 
temporarily park some of the windfall in a sovereign wealth fund until the non-traded sector 
has produced enough home-grown capital (infrastructure, teachers, nurses, etc.) to alleviate 
absorption bottlenecks and allow a gradual rise in consumption (see appendix 4). The   41
economy experiences temporary appreciation of the real exchange rate and other Dutch 
disease symptoms. However, these are reversed as home-grown capital is accumulated. 
There are many other resource management issues. First, governments should realize 
that, if imports are mostly financed by an exogenous stream of foreign exchange coming from 
resource rents, revenue generated by tariffs is illusory as the increase in tariff revenue is offset 
by reducing real resource revenue (Collier and Venables, 2010). Tariffs effectively reduce the 
domestic purchasing power of the windfall of foreign exchange. Second, tax capacity 
typically erodes quickly during windfalls. Since legal and fiscal capacity are likely to be 
complements (Besley and Persson, 2009a), this leads to grave concerns about the adequate 
supply of common-interest public goods such as fighting external wars or inclusive political 
institutions. Third, the political economy of windfalls dictates that incumbents may avoid 
putting resource revenues in a liquid sovereign wealth fund which can be easily raided by 
political rivals. There is thus a bias to excessive investment in illiquid, partisan projects, 
especially if the probability of being kicked out of office is high (Collier et al., 2010). There 
may also be a tendency to over-invest in partisan projects with negative social surplus (‘white 
elephants’) if politicians find it hard to credibly commit to socially efficient projects 
(Robinson and Torvik, 2005). Fourth, harnessing windfalls in face of the notorious volatility 
of commodity prices implies that governments build precautionary and liquidity buffers (by 
postponing spending and bringing taxes forwards) and extract natural resources excessively 
fast (compared with the certainty-equivalent Hotelling rule) to minimize the commodity price 
risk of future remaining reserves, especially if the degree of prudence is high and commodity 
price shocks are persistent and have high variance (van der Ploeg, 2010b). Future work needs 
to extend existing results on uncertainty about future demand for the resource and about 
exploration and reserves that will ultimately be available for exploitation (e.g., Pindyck, 1980) 
to a setting where governments must decide on their intra- en intertemporal allocation of 
public goods and setting of tax rates. It is also necessary to investigate how options and other 
financial instruments can be used to shield economies from commodity price volatility and 
what political constraints prevent these instruments from being used in practise. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
A quasi-experimental within-country study of the districts of Brazil suggests that the 
economic argument that a resource bonanza induces appreciation of the real exchange rate 
and a decline of non-resource export sectors may have some relevance, but much more panel-
data and quasi-experimental studies are needed to shed light on this key issue. The best 
available empirical evidence suggests that countries with a large share of primary exports in 
GNP have bad growth records and high inequality, especially if quality of institutions, rule of 
law and corruption are bad. This potential curse is particularly severe for point-source   42
resources such as diamonds and precious metals. The resource curse is, however, not cast in 
stone. Resource rich countries with good institutions, trade openness and high investments in 
exploration technology seem to enjoy the fruits of their natural resource wealth. On the other 
hand, the curse seems more severe in presidential democracies. Resource rich countries are 
also vulnerable to the notorious volatility of commodity prices, especially if their financial 
system is not well developed. Recent research, taking account of the endogeneity of resource 
dependence, suggests that volatility may be the quintessence of the resource curse. Of course, 
there is also cross-country and panel-data econometric evidence that natural resource 
dependence may undermine the quality of institutions. And there is an interesting quasi-
experimental study on São Tomé, using Cape Verde as control, which suggests that 
announcements of oil discoveries lead to corruption. Resource bonanzas also reinforce rent 
grabbing, especially if institutions are bad, and keep in place bad policies (debt overhang, 
building a too generous welfare state, etc.). There is also evidence that dependence of point-
source resources makes countries prone to civil conflict and war, although these results fail to 
convincingly take account of the effect of conflict on natural resource production. A recent 
quasi-experimental study on the districts of Columbia offer evidence that capital-intensive 
resources such as oil are much more prone to civil conflict than labour-intensive resources 
such as coffee, rice or bananas. 
Although from a normative perspective countries should invest their natural resource 
rents into reproducible assets such as physical capital, human capital, infrastructure or foreign 
assets, World Bank data suggest that resource rich economies do not fully reinvest their 
resource wealth and therefore have negative genuine saving rates. But resource rich countries 
may grow less simply because they save less than other countries. However, if these countries 
anticipate a positive rate of increases in future resource prices or continual improvements in 
exploration technology, it may make sense for them to borrow. Rival factions competing for 
control of resources will speed up extraction and may well lead to over-investment. To 
explain negative genuine saving more is needed; for example, rapacious resource extraction 
being associated with erosion of the legal system, inefficient rent seeking, investment in 
‘white elephants’, and short-sighted politicians. In well developed economies it may be 
optimal to put natural resource revenues in a sovereign wealth fund. In contrast, developing 
countries often face capital scarcity in which case it is more appropriate to use the windfall to 
pay off debt and lower interest rates to boost private and domestic capital accumulation and 
speed up the process of economic development. Many countries find it hard to absorb a 
substantial and prolonged windfall of foreign exchange, since it takes time for the non-traded 
sectors to accumulate ‘home-grown’ capital. Whilst these Dutch disease bottlenecks are being 
resolved, it is optimal to park the windfall revenue abroad until there is enough capacity to   43
sensibly invest in the domestic economy. However, fear of the fund being raided by political 
rivals can induce a sub-optimal political bias towards too much partisan, illiquid investment.  
An interesting option is to change the constitution to guarantee that resource revenues 
are handed to the public. The government has to subsequently tax its citizens to finance its 
spending programmes. The advantage is that the burden of proof for spending resource 
revenues is with the government. Most important is for countries to learn from the US history 
and adopt an optimistic, forward-looking approach to technological innovation in resource 
exploration and the search for new reserves. Predatory governments induce mining companies 
to be less transparent about their natural resource revenues and become less efficient.
22 
The analysis of resource rich countries draws on macroeconomics, public finance, 
public policy, international economics, resource economics, economic history and applied 
econometrics. It also benefits from collaboration with political scientists and historians. More 
research needs to be directed at the changing role of institutions throughout history and in 
particular to understand why the resource curse seems to be something of the last four or five 
decades whereas before natural resources were harnessed to promote growth. Also, future 
work should apply the insights from contract theory to design good incentive-compatible 
contracts between governments and exploration companies. Future research should also be 
directed at appropriate design of auctioning mineral rights. Work is also needed on the 
question of whether resource rich countries have different saving patterns, e.g., in world 
financial markets (“petrodollars”) rather than in domestic productive capital, and on how this 
might affect their rate of economic growth if reserves are privately owned. The answers 
should be contrasted with the situation where reserves are publicly owned and managed by 
politicians who may be voted out of office soon. The answers will undoubtedly depend on 
whether there is presidential or a parliamentary system. Future research should tackle these 
questions with rich political economy models. 
The wide diversity in experiences of countries with substantial natural resources 
means that comparative analysis and exchange of experiences of managing resource rich 
economies could be very fruitful, and that real progress can be made in advancing the plight 
of poor countries with abundant natural resources. Future empirical work should move from 
cross-section to panel-data regressions to overcome problems of omitted variable bias and to 
allow for the changing quality of institutions (see IMF, 2005). At the same time, detailed 
country studies and quasi-experimental studies are necessary as often the devil is in the detail 
                                                 
22 Using a panel of 72 industries from 51 countries over 16 years, the negative effect of expropriation 
risk on corporate transparency appears to be strongest for industries whose profits are highly correlated 
with oil prices and transparency is lower if oil prices are high and property rights are bad (Durnev and 
Guriev, 2007). Lack of transparency may lead oil-rich countries to over-report reserves to raise 
expected future supply, discourage rival development of oil substitutes and thus improve future market 
conditions (Sauré, 2008).   44
and results are often clouded by confounding factors. The discovery of natural resources has 
often been associated with devastating conflicts and disastrous economic performance. Future 
research should thus extend the normative theories of optimally converting depleting natural 
resources into productive assets on to allow for rent seeking, corruption and conflict. More 
generally, more work is needed on how to manage natural resource revenues in a way that 
promotes sustainable growth, alleviates poverty and avoids conflict. This challenge is 
particularly relevant for the resource rich, volatile and conflict prone economies of Africa 
with their high population growth rates and poor institutions. 
 
Appendix 1: Unemployment and Dutch disease 
A higher world price of natural resources has in the presence of short-run nominal rigidities 
significant effects on unemployment and inflation (Eastwood and Venables, 1982; Buiter and 
Purvis, 1983; van Wijnbergen, 1984b). Although a higher oil price boosts demand for the 
domestic manufacturing good, that effect may be swamped by the real appreciation created by 
increased demand for the home currency. The result may be a decline in domestic 
manufacturing output and higher unemployment as well as a temporary rise in inflation. The 
oil price shock has elements of both a demand and supply shock, but an increase in resource 
reserves is mainly a demand shock. Natural resource discoveries generate permanent income 
effects well beyond the productive life of the new natural resource reserve. The initial 
increase in income above its permanent level leads to a current account surplus, but is 
reversed when reserves runs out. Natural resource windfalls do not necessarily imply a 
shrinking of manufacturing exports or output and an increase in unemployment, but if a 
windfall is anticipated the real exchange will appreciate and unemployment will rise ahead of 
the windfall. Other simulations of Dutch disease effects and unemployment use perfect-
foresight, intertemporal general equilibrium models with temporary real wage rigidity, short-
run capital specificity, long-run capital mobility between sectors, international capital 
mobility, intermediate inputs, adjustment costs of investment, dynamics of capital 
accumulation, government debt, current account imbalances and far-sighted behaviour of 
firms and households (Bruno and Sachs, 1982). With overlapping generations or household 
liquidity constraints, it matters whether the government uses the resource windfall to cut 
public debt or increase transfers. Oil price shocks then induce real appreciation and transient 
unemployment. It is worthwhile to investigate further the effects of resource dependence on 
wage formation in competitive and non-competitive labour markets (Chatterji and Price, 1988; 
Brunstad and Dyrstad, 1997). Capital market imperfections may also generate adverse growth 
effects of resource booms. For example, if resource income cannot be invested in 
international capital markets, resource rich economies may experience slower steady-state 
growth as people live beyond their means and are overshooting their steady-state levels 
(Rodriguez and Sachs, 1999). 
 
Appendix 2: Endogenous growth and Dutch disease 
We extend Sachs and Warner (1995) to allow for natural resource use in production of traded 
goods, RT. The traded and non-traded sectors have the same labour-augmenting productivity   45
growth, fully determined by the share of employment in the traded sector LT. The production 
functions of the two sectors in extensive and intensive form are thus given by: 
 
NT t - 1 - 1 F( , , ) and X G( , )  with  =(1+ L )  , >0  and
/ F(1, , ) f ( , ) and  / G(1, ) g( ).
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The zero profit conditions are 1 = cW(W,r,Q)W + cr(W,r,Q)r + cQ(W,r,Q)Q and dW(W,r)W + 
dr(W,r)r = P,  where W indicates the wage, r the exogenous world interest rate, and c(.) and 
d(.) are the unit-cost functions homogenous of degree one associated with the CRTS 
production functions G(.) and F(.). They give the price of non-traded goods P and the wage W 
in terms of the world interest rate r and the world resource price Q. Capital market 
equilibrium demands Pg(kN) = f(kT,rT) = r and gives, together with the condition fr(kT,rT)=Q,  
kN, kT and rT in terms of r and P (or Q). We obtain (suppressing r) that rT=rT(Q), rT′<0 and: 
 
NW Q W N Q W( ), P( ),  k ( ) with P d W c /c 0 and k P / 0.
N WQ P Q k Q g g ′ ′′ ′ ′ ′ == = = = − = − < <  
Along the factor price frontier, the wage and the price of non-traded goods decrease if the 
world price of natural resources increases. The latter induces a fall in capital intensity of the 
non-traded sector. Overlapping households with logarithmic utility and discount factor 
1/(1+ρ)<1 enjoy wage w when young and receive a natural resource dividend per effective 
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where μ indicates the relative utility weight (and budget share) of non-traded consumption. 
The factor (1+LNt-1) is necessary to convert from old to young workers, the factor (1-LNt) is to 
convert output per worker to output per young worker in the non-traded sector, and the labour 
market equilibrium condition LTt + LNt = 1 has been used. This condition for non-traded goods 
market equilibrium can be written as a stable difference equation LTt=Ω(LTt-1,et,et-1,Qt,Qt-1) 
with 0<Ω1<1, Ωi<0, i=2,3,4,5. An increase in resource dividend induces a gradual shift of 
employment from the non-traded to the traded sector (LT falls), so there is less learning by 
doing and the growth rate is permanently lowered ((Ht–Ht-1)/Ht-1 falls). In this setup the 
resource dividend cannot affect relative productivity. If this dividend is driven by a higher 
world price of resources, depreciation of the real exchange rate and the lower capital intensity 
in production of non-traded goods lead to even bigger falls in traded sector employment, 
learning by doing and the rate of growth. GDP is given by Qe + WH + r(KT+KN) = QE + 
(W+r)H[kN+LT(kT–kN)]. Hence, GDP grows at the rate ξθLT where the non-resource share of 
GDP is ξ. Non-resource GDP falls on impact after a shock in Qe1 if the traded sector is 
capital-intensive, that is ∂GDP/∂(Qe1)=1+(W+r)H1(∂LT1/∂(Qe1))(kT–kN)<1) as ∂LT1/∂(Qe1)<0. 
 
Appendix 3: Hartwick rule for reinvesting natural resource rents in a closed economy 
Does exhaustibility of natural resources constrain the growth potential if resources are 
essential in production? The answer depends on the ease with which reproducible inputs can 
be substituted for exhaustible natural resources. Utilitarian social welfare implies that 
consumption first rises and then vanishes in the long run (e.g., Dasgupta and Heal, 1979). It is 
difficult to defend from an ethical point of view that the consumption level of future   46
generations vanishes asymptotically. Hence, the normative focus in the literature on natural 
resources has been on max-min egalitarianism which leads to a constant level of per capita 
consumption. Non-decreasing per capita consumption is infeasible under exponential 
population growth if resources are essential inputs in production and there is no technical 
progress (Dasgupta and Heal, 1974; Solow, 1974; Stiglitz, 1974), but feasible with quasi-
arithmetic population growth (Mitra, 1983; Asheim, et. al., 2007). The so-called Hartwick 
rule states that natural resource rents should be fully reinvested in reproducible capital under 
max-min social welfare. This entails in the absence of population growth a constant savings 
rate equal to the constant functional share of resource inputs (Hartwick, 1977). With no 
population growth and no technical progress, the economy features constant consumption and 
is thus a max-min optimum. If there is positive population growth, a max-min optimum 
requires constant consumption per head. If consumption per head were rising (falling) over 
time, welfare could be raised if earlier (later) generations saved and invested less or consume 
capital at the expense of later (earlier) generations. A max-min optimum then requires that 
investment in reproducible capital exceeds natural resource rents.  
Consider a closed economy with resource depletion 
0 0 (t)dt , RS
∞
= ∫  zero depreciation, 
savings rate 
.
/, s KY ≡  Cobb-Douglas production Y = F(K,R) = K
αR
βL
1−α−β, and population 
growth rate equal to η.  Firms set marginal products to factor prices, that is FR = Q and FK = r. 
The Hotelling rule in absence of extraction costs is   
.. .
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If there is no population growth (η = 0), all resource rents must be invested in capital to 
sustain a constant income per capita (i.e., QR = sY or s = β). This is the well-known Hartwick 
rule and holds for general production functions.
23 It corresponds to a max-min optimum, since 
it sustains constant consumption per capita. With population growth (η > 0), the country must 
invest more than the resource rents to sustain constant income and constant consumption per 
capita (s* > β). The interest rate then declines while the capital-output ratio rises with time, so 
the saving rate rises over time. The steady-state depletion rate is r−η, so societies with fast 
growing populations should deplete their resources less rapidly.  
   Without population growth and technical progress, the Hartwick rule also results in a 
max-min optimum in economies with many consumption goods, heterogeneous capital goods 
and endogenous labour supplies provided there is free disposal and stock reversal (Dixit et al., 
1980). The conditions under which a max-min optimum implies adherence to the Hartwick 
rule are also known (e.g., Withagen and Asheim, 1998; Mitra, 2002).  
The Hartwick rule is related to the Hicksian definition of real income, that is “the 
maximum amount a man can spend and still be as well off at the end of the week as at the 
beginning”. The general equilibrium features of such a Hicksian definition of real income, 
                                                 
23 Differentiating 
.
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.
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defined as zero change in the present discounted value of current and future utility, are well 
understood (Asheim and Weitzman, 1991; Sefton and Weale, 2006). In contrast to national 
accounting practice, income must be deflated with the Divisia consumption price index rather 
than the price index of output. Aggregation across multiple infinitely-lived households with 
heterogeneous consumption preferences is feasible under constant returns to scale. The return 
on the increasingly scarce natural resource increases at the expense of the increasingly 
abundant other factors of production. Capital gains then represent capitalization of those 
future changes in factor prices and are effectively a transfer from one factor to another rather 
than a change in resources available to the whole economy. As a result, in a closed economy 
where all factors are entirely owned by households, the net gains are zero and capital gains 
should not be included in real income.  
 
Appendix 4: Absorption constraints and Dutch disease dynamics 
Assume a small open dependent economy with perfect access to the international capital 
market. The traded good is the numeraire. Production in the traded sector only used labour, so 
normalizing productivity at one we have YT = LT and W = 1. The non-traded sector has a 
Cobb-Douglas production function, YN = K
α LN
1−α, 0 < α < 1. Profit maximization yields the 
demand for labour in the non-traded sector, LN = K[(1−α)P]
1/α, where P is the relative price of 
non-traded goods. Labour market equilibrium then gives  LT = 1− K[(1−α)P]
1/α. Output of 
non-traded goods is given by YN = K[(1−α)P]
(1−α)/α. Denoting the unit-cost function for 
producing capital goods by c(P) = P
γ with 0 < γ < 1 the share of non-traded goods in the 
production of home-grown capital, profit maximization requires that the marginal product of 
capital, r(P) = α[(1−α)P]
(1−α)/α, must equal the rental change, r*, plus the depreciation charge, 
δ, minus the expected capital gains, c( ) / c( ). P P   Preferences are homothetic and e(P) = P
β, 
0< β < 1, denotes the unit-expenditure function, hence consumption is non-traded goods is 
given by CN = e′(P)U, where U denotes real consumption (or utility). Equilibrium on the 
market for non-traded goods is given by CN + c′(P)I = YN, where IK K δ =+  denotes gross 
investment.  The representative consumer maximizes utility, 
0 ln( )exp( )d , Ut t ρ
∞
− ∫ subject to 
the constraint,  []
**
00 00 e( ) c( ) exp( )d ( )exp( )d , TN P U P I r tt F V Y P Y r tt
∞∞
+− ≤ + + + − ∫∫ where  F 
indicates foreign assets (bonds) and V the present value of natural resource revenues (i.e., 
natural resource wealth). The budget constraint states that the present value of the stream of 
current and future consumption and investment spending on traded and non-traded goods 
cannot exceed initial foreign assets plus initial resource wealth plus the present value of 
current and future traded and non-traded production. If we suppose that r* = ρ, the optimality 
condition for the consumer is 1/U = λ e(P), where the marginal utility of wealth λ has to be 
constant over time. At the time the resource windfall becomes known (upward jump in V0), λ 
jumps down and stays at this lower value forever after. A resource windfall thus corresponds 
to an unanticipated, permanent fall in the marginal utility of wealth λ.  
  The adjustment path follows from the system of differential equations describing, 
respectively, equilibrium in the market for non-traded goods and equity arbitrage:   48
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The steady-state value of P is independent of λ, but the steady-state value of K increases after 
downward and permanent jump in λ induced by a windfall of foreign exchange. Note that as 
the share of traded goods in capital goods vanishes, γ→0, the capital stock adjusts 
immediately to a natural resource windfall. As a result of the downward jump in λ, there is an 
immediate and permanent upward jump in K and there is no need for the real exchange rate to 
appreciate whatsoever. However, much capital (think of nurses and teachers as well as 
infrastructure) must be home-grown and cannot be imported. Consequently, γ is closer to one 
and absorption constraints will manifest themselves. This may be seen from the saddle-path 
diagram given in fig. 7. The optimal response to a windfall is for the real exchange to 
appreciate on impact signalling labour to shift from the traded to the non-traded sector and 
shifting demand from non-traded to traded goods. Over time, investment induces a gradual 
expansion in home-grown capital which permits a gradual reversal of the initial appreciation 
of the real exchange rate. The resulting temporary boost to the return on capital in the non-
traded sector r(P) is in line with the anticipated capital losses on those capital goods (as over 
time the relative price of investment goods c(P) will fall and return to its original level). The 
windfall results in an immediate and permanent increase in the consumption of traded goods, 
but consumption of non-traded goods increases on impact and subsequently continues to 
increase towards its new steady-state level. Home-grown capital also jumps up on impact and 
then continues to rise to its new steady-state level. Due to the gradual increase in consumption 
as supply constraints are gradually relaxed, the total stock of assets increases by more than the 
windfall. Hence, there is initial saving (parking funds abroad) relative to the permanent 
income hypothesis. Van der Ploeg and Venables (2010b) provide a much more general 
analysis allowing for capital accumulation in the traded sector as well and highlighting the 
impossibility of shifting capital between the two sectors once it has been installed.  
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Table 1: Effects of resource dependence and institutional quality on economic growth  
 
Annual growth in real 
GDP per capita 
Sachs and Warner 
(1997a) 
Based on data in 
Sachs and Warner 
(1997b) 
Mehlum, Moene and 
Torvik (2005a) 
Initial income  -1.76 (8.56)  -1.28 (6.65)  -1.26 (6.70) 
Openness  1.33 (3.35)  1.45 (3.36)  1.66 (3.87) 
Resource dependence  -10.57 (7.01)  -6.69 (5.43)  -14.34 (4.21) 
Rule of law  0.36 (3.54)  -  - 
Institutional quality -  0.6  (0.64) -1.3  (1.13) 
Investments  1.02 (3.45) 0.15 (6.73) 0.16 (7.15) 
Interaction term  -  -  15.40 (2.40) 
Number of countries  71  87  87 
Adjusted R
2  0.72 0.69  0.71 
 
 
Table 2: Marginal effects of different resources on growth for varying institutional quality 
 
 Primary  exports 
share of GDP 
Ores and metals 




share of GNP 
Production of 
gold, silver and 
diamonds as 
share of GDP 
Worst 
institutions 
−0.548  −0.946  −1.127  −1.145 
Average 
institutions 
−0.378  0.425 0.304 0.279 
Average + one 
s.d. institutions 
−0.288  1.152 1.062 1.183 
Best institutions  −0.228  1.629 1.560 1.776 
 
Note: Institutional quality is an average of the indexes for bureaucracy, corruption, rule of law, 
risk of expropriation of private investment and repudiation of contracts by government. 
Source: Boschini, et. al. (2007) 
 
Table 3: Total, natural, produced and intangible capital, 2000 
 
 
Note: All dollars at nominal exchange rates. Oil states excluded. 
Source: World Bank (2006, Table 2.1)   60
Table 4: Components of natural capital, 2000 
 
 
Note: NTFR stands for non-timber forest resources. Oil states excluded. 
 








Source: World Bank (2006, page 29) 
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igure 2: Declining natural resource dependence in the global economy  
 






Fuels, ores and metals exports in percent of merchandise exports 1970-2002 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
 
















Key:   A resource boom shifts A to A′, so a shift from the traded to non-traded sector and 
real appreciation. With time relative productivity of the traded declines if the 
elasticity of substitution in demand goods is less than unity. This shifts the 
equilibrium from A′ to A″ and eventually to B. In the long run there is real 













































































Figure 3: Rent grabbing and producer friendly institutions 
 
Key:  A resource bonanza shifts equilibrium from A to A″ if there are strong institutions, 
which means higher profits and more entrepreneurs. In case of weak institutions the 









Source: World Bank (2006, Figure 3.4)   63




Source: World Bank (2006, Figure 4.1). 
 
 





Key: The incremental consumption path indicated by ‘Developing’ is the optimal path 
obtained by maximizing social welfare for a developing economy which suffers capital 
scarcity and has to pay an interest premium on its outstanding foreign debt. 
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Figure 7: Absorption constraints and Dutch disease dynamics 
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